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Abstract 
Using the adoption of the Arrowhead trading platform in January 2010 as an exogenous event, 
we investigate the effects of algorithmic trading on stock market liquidity and commonality in 
liquidity under different market conditions on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. After controlling for 
endogeneity, we find algorithmic trading increases stock liquidity by narrowing spreads and 
increasing market depth. Furthermore, algorithmic trading increases commonality in liquidity at 
both high and low frequency. These findings appear to arise due to the reduction in monitoring 
costs. Further analysis reveals that, following large market declines, the effect of algorithmic 
trading on spreads and market depth weakens while the effect on commonality in stock liquidity 
intensifies. 
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The Role of Algorithmic Trading in Stock Liquidity and Commonality in Electronic Limit 
Order Markets 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent technological advancements have led to the proliferation of a new form of trading, 
algorithmic trading (AT) which relies on computer algorithms to make automatic trading 
decisions, submit orders, and manage orders after submission. High frequency traders, a subset 
of algorithmic traders, have a differentiating strategic feature of adopting very short stock 
holding horizons of as little as a millisecond (for a detailed description, see Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2009)). In the past decade, AT has come to dominate many developed stock markets, prompting 
many stock exchanges to upgrade their trading platforms accordingly. In this study, we take an 
encompassing approach to understand the impact of AT on an electronic limit order market by 
examining its effects on three dimensions, namely, (1) bid-ask spreads and market depths, (2) 
commonality in liquidity, and (3) market liquidity after large market declines.  
 A growing body of literature seeks to understand the impact of AT on markets but these 
studies provide conflicting results. Some studies argue that AT can benefit market participants 
and reduce transaction costs by increasing competition among liquidity providers and 
eliminating information friction (e.g., Hendershott et al., 2011; Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012). 
Others emphasize the detrimental effects of AT on market quality, such as the increase in 
mispricing due to the increase in execution risk (Frino et al., 2016). Algorithmic traders, through 
their ability to process information rapidly, can also exploit other traders such as those who trade 
for liquidity reasons (e.g., Cartea and Penalva, 2012). Although insightful, this literature offers 
little information about the behavior of algorithmic traders in volatile markets, nor does it specify 
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the effects of AT on commonality in liquidity, a form of systematic risk that affects asset pricing 
and is more intense during large market declines (Hameed et al., 2010).  
 To mitigate the endogeneity problem as well as to investigate the above issues, we 
consider an electronic limit order market, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), using data from 
2007 to 2012. The TSE is a specifically suitable setting for this analysis for several reasons. First, 
it represents a large, well-developed electronic limit order book (LOB) market, comparable to 
many other international exchanges; it was the second market to adopt electronic trading in 1982, 
after the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1977 (Jain, 2005). In a limit order market, algorithmic 
traders can act as either liquidity suppliers or liquidity demanders, so their influence on liquidity 
may differ compared with that observed in hybrid markets, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange. More importantly, the TSE adopted a new trading platform, Arrowhead, on 4 January 
2010, specifically to cater to the high speed requirements of algorithmic traders, so it provides an 
ideal experimental setting.  
We measure the amount of AT by examining message traffic, obtained from intraday 
transactions data. Biais and Weill (2009) provide its theoretical support by showing that the ratio 
of messages to volume increases with the rate at which investors can contact the market.  This 
measurement is first used in Hendershott et al. (2011) as an AT proxy on the U.S. stock market; 
and Boehmer et al. (2015) apply this measure to the AT activities across 39 international 
exchanges. In this study, we choose to use this proxy for AT as it enables us to examine the 
trading by algorithmic traders, a precondition for high frequency trading (HFT), in a wide cross-
section of stocks listed on the TSE. This approach enhances the generalizability of our study to 
the whole market, instead of a selection of stocks. To reflect the full picture of market liquidity, 
we consider measures that capture both spreads and market depths. These liquidity measures are 
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the quoted bid–ask spread, effective spread, market depth at the best prices, and market depth at 
five levels of quoted prices.  
 We use two-stage least squares regression models (2SLS) in our empirical analysis, using 
the adoption of Arrowhead trading platform as an exogenous shock to AT. The first stage 
regression results across all model specifications consistently show an increase in AT following 
the adoption of Arrowhead.  Moreover, after controlling for the endogeneity issue, we observe 
that AT is associated with lower quoted and effective bid–ask spreads and higher market depth. 
Although AT is associated with reductions in both realized spread (revenues for liquidity 
provision) and adverse selection cost (revenues for informed trading), the AT effect is 
economically stronger on realized spread. Using the adoption of Arrowhead as an instrumental 
variable in the 2SLS analysis, we also find that AT is positively correlated with low- and high-
frequency commonality in stock liquidity across all liquidity measures. Furthermore, we explore 
the reduction of monitoring costs as one potential mechanism for the liquidity effects of AT. We 
find supporting evidence that the effects of AT are most pronounced among stocks with high 
monitoring costs proxied by small firm size, low levels of analyst and media coverage.  
In our final analysis, we examine whether algorithmic traders behave differently during 
periods associated with high levels of market uncertainty. Contrary to the results related to 
normal market conditions, AT widens spreads in the aftermath of stock market declines. 
Moreover, AT increases commonality in liquidity to a greater extent following stressful market 
episodes. These findings are particularly worrisome because AT appears to consume liquidity 
and increases liquidity commonality in down markets where liquidity is needed the most.  
 Our research adds to a fast growing body of literature on AT, including studies focusing 
on HFT. Several studies analyze the effects of AT on market liquidity using data from U.S. 
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equity markets (e.g., Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009; Hendershott et al., 2011), international foreign 
exchange markets (e.g., Chaboud et al., 2011; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2012), or futures 
markets (Kirilenko et al., 2011). Notably, Hendershott et al. (2011) is the pioneering study in this 
line of research that first documents the positive effects of AT on liquidity and informativeness 
of quotes on a sample of New York Stock Exchange common stocks. Although comprehensive, 
this sample of the study ends in 2005 which precedes the steep growth of A  and their findings 
may not be generalizable to other markets under different structures such as the TSE where the 
LOB system is used. Subsequently, several studies (Hendershott and Riordan (2013) in 
Germany; Anand and Venkataraman (2016) in Canada) attempt to examine the AT effects 
outside the US but most only use a selection of stocks or a brief sample period due to the lack of 
data.  
       Our study fills the gap in the literature by looking at the effects of AT on liquidity and 
commonality in the largest LOB market in Asia - TSE (World Federation of Exchanges, 2012), 
using the full sample of TSE stocks.  In this context, two studies are particularly relevant to our 
research. Using a comprehensive international sample of 42 equity markets, Boehmer et al. 
(2015) document an improvement in liquidity but worsening in volatility with the increase in 
AT; AT is proxied by the same measure adopted in this study. While insightful, many important 
market-specific peculiarities could be confounded in a large international sample wherein 
markets with distinct progressions in AT are aggregated. Two specific aspects set our study apart 
from theirs: (1) Instead of using the co-location event that occurred on TSE in May 2009, we use 
the Arrowhead adoption as the exogenous shock to AT. As clearly evidenced in Figure 1, this is 
a more appropriate event to examine than the co-location event for stocks on TSE. There is no 
discernable change in AT activity around May 2009 but Figure 1 clearly shows a steady surge 
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post January 2010; (2) Their study examines the impact of AT on various conventional market 
quality measures including liquidity and volatility cross-sectionally and across time, whereas we 
conduct a nuanced analysis of two important dimensions of market liquidity (Hameed et al., 
2010), that is, stock-level liquidity and commonality in liquidity based on the 2SLS approach 
using the Arrowhead adoption as the natural AT event.    
      Similar to our study, Jain et al. (2012) utilize the Arrowhead event in their study. They find 
that the LOB liquidity measured by the cost of immediacy (COI) and LOB slope improves, and 
auto correlation and cross correlation in order flow increase in their sample period which is one 
year after the adoption of the Arrowhead system. While both studies are complementary, they  
differ substantially from ours in a number of ways. Jain et al. (2012) use liquidity measures (COI 
and LOB slope) to capture the liquidity in the full LOB whereas our measures reflect the 
liquidity on the top of LOB which have been found to be more informative of the offsetting 
social benefits (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Gai, Yao and Ye, 2013).
1
 Further, Jain et al. (2013) 
focus on intraday commonality in liquidity gauged by cross-correlation in order flow using only 
three months of trading data in the pre-crisis, post-crisis and post-Arrowhead periods, 
respectively. Our work looks into the AT effect on commonality in liquidity at both high and low 
frequency using four alternative liquidity measures for a longer sample period from 2007 to 
2012. A much longer sample allows for time series variations in the AT effect and indeed we 
show an intensified AT effect on liquidity commonality during market downturns. The last 
differentiation lies in the research design. Jain et al. (2013) does not measure AT activity 
                                                 
1
 Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) argue that active quoting behaviour of AT may arise as a consequence of quote-
stuffing. Quote-stuffing refers to a particular strategic AT that attempts to conceal trading strategies by submitting a 
large volume of messages. Gai, Yao, and Ye (2013) suggest that quote stuffing induced by AT only transfers wealth 
among traders but has no offsetting social benefits.  
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explicitly but infers this from the Arrowhead adoption. We clearly address the endogeneity 
concern by measuring AT using message traffic and instrument the AT variable with the 
Arrowhead adoption as well as include firm fixed effects in the 2SLS regression framework.  
 In Section 2, we outline some existing literature and discuss our research questions. 
Section 3 contains a description of our data and research methods. In Section 4, we analyze the 
effect of AT on stock liquidity and commonality in stock liquidity in normal and extreme market 
conditions. In Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of implications. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The global proliferation of AT has prompted a rapidly growing number of studies that analyze 
the impacts of AT and HFT on market environments. Although this literature remains in its 
infancy, it already is marked by controversy about how AT affects market quality. We discuss, in 
detail, both theoretical and empirical findings in this realm.   
2.1 EFFECT OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING ON MARKET QUALITY  
Computerized AT and HFT have shortened the time the market takes to respond to news events 
and dramatically increased the speed of transactions. Considering this faster response to news 
events, there are good reasons to think that AT improves market quality. Unlike their human 
counterparts, machines can process vast amounts of information in a fraction of the time that 
humans would require. Thus AT can considerably reduce the monitoring costs of market makers 
and enhance liquidity (Foucault et al., 2013).
2
 In addition, algorithmic traders gather information 
                                                 
2
 In their model, Foucault et al. (2013) show that the effect of ATs on liquidity depends on whether the reduction in 
monitoring costs mainly affects liquidity providers or suppliers. When ATs mainly reduce monitoring costs for 
liquidity demanders, the rate at which liquidity gets consumed is higher than the rate at which it is supplied.  
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simultaneously across different exchanges and in different but related securities, which helps 
them set more efficient prices and therefore decreases the transaction costs of liquidity traders 
(Gerig and Michayluk, 2016; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2012). Even if algorithmic traders are 
uninformed, their automated liquidity provision likely increases competition among liquidity 
suppliers and reduces transaction costs.  
 However, some theories highlight the negative externalities of AT. For example, Cartea 
and Penalva (2012) model the intermediating role of high frequency traders between liquidity 
traders and market makers, such that traders exacerbate the price impact of liquidity traders by 
extracting trading surplus with their speed advantage. Biais et al. (2012) analyze the trading 
equilibrium when high frequency traders are present and find that HFT enables fast traders to 
process information before slow traders, giving rise to adverse selection costs. Using an 
arbitrage-free pricing approach, Jarrow and Protter (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion: The 
speed advantage of high frequency traders creates arbitrage opportunities at the expense of 
ordinary traders and thus makes the market less efficient. Yet theoretical studies are inconclusive 
thus far about the relationship between AT and market liquidity, with different conclusions 
drawn depending on the strategies and market environments assumed.  
 Despite the theoretical debate, most empirical findings that identify particular groups of 
algorithmic traders or construct proxies for AT (using intraday transactions data) suggest that AT 
actually increases market quality. For example, Hendershott and Riordan (2013) examine 
algorithmic trades on 30 DAX stocks traded on the Deutsche Boerse in January 2008 and find 
that the efficient quotes that algorithmic traders place lead to efficient market prices. Brogaard 
(2010) analyzes the trading behavior of 26 high frequency traders on 120 NASDAQ stocks and 
finds evidence that they provide the best bid and ask quotes for a significant portion of the day. 
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On the same sample, Carrion (2013) suggests that high frequency traders supply liquidity when it 
is scarce and consume liquidity when plentiful. Menkveld (2013) characterizes the cross-market 
trading strategy of one large high frequency trader and find that the trades of the high frequency 
trader are predominately passive which provide liquidity to other traders. Using data from 
NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm, Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) distinguish market-making HFT 
from opportunistic HFT and document that market makers constituent the majority (63%-72%) 
of HFT trading volume.  
Another set of studies uses proxies to measure the extent of AT, which allows analyses of 
a greater cross-section of the market. For example, Hendershott et al. (2011) use the arrival rate 
of messages as a proxy for AT and find that AT narrows spreads and reduces adverse selection 
costs, particularly for large stocks. Using a broad sample of stocks across 42 stock exchanges, 
Boehmer et al. (2015) reach a similar conclusion. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) use reference 
numbers supplied with NASDAQ transactions data to link each individual limit order with its 
subsequent cancellation or execution and propose a HFT measure based on “strategic runs”. 
Their results suggest that the increased HFT activities lead to lower spreads and higher displayed 
depth in the limit order book. For our analysis, we use the AT proxy proposed by Hendershott et 
al. (2011) as it enables us to examine all stocks listed on the TSE. By design, this measure will 
capture both AT and an important subset of AT –  HFT.  
 Compared with extant empirical studies, our research offers two new insights. First, we 
base our analysis on the TSE, an electronic limit order market. The effect of AT on market 
liquidity may differ from the influences documented using data from U.S. exchanges. Prior 
studies of electronic limit order markets suggest a possible blurring of the distinction between 
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liquidity providers and liquidity demanders (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).
3
 Because algorithmic 
traders can either demand or supply liquidity, the net effect of AT on the liquidity of an 
electronic limit order market is unclear and worthy of empirical research (Foucault et al., 2013). 
Second, the implementation of the new trading platform by the TSE in 2010, designed 
specifically to cater to the infrastructure requirements of AT, constitutes an exogenous event for 
the AT in our analysis. Through an event study, we mitigate endogeneity concerns over the 
relationship between AT and market liquidity.  
2.2 EFFECT OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING ON COMMONALITY IN LIQUIDITY  
As liquidity means more than an attribute of a single asset, many studies investigate how 
individual stock liquidity co-moves with market-wide liquidity, in terms of both spreads and 
depths. The phenomenon is not limited to U.S. markets; ample evidence suggests the existence 
of commonality in liquidity internationally (see for example, Brockman et al., 2009; Chordia et 
al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Karolyi et al., 2012). Recognizing commonality in 
liquidity is inherently important, for at least two reasons. First, prior studies (Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Lee, 2011) suggest that commonality in liquidity poses a systematic liquidity 
risk, with a significant bearing on asset pricing. Second, theoretical work on the funding 
constraints for liquidity provision (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Kyle and Xiong, 2001) 
predicts that liquidity demand increases sharply and supply falls during market declines as 
investors seek to liquidate their positions and liquidity suppliers hit their funding constraints. In 
turn, commonality in liquidity should intensify during market turmoil.  
                                                 
3
 Empirical evidence offered by Brogaard (2010) and Hendershott and Riordan (2013) confirms that high frequency 
traders can be either liquidity providers or demanders.  
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 Motivated by the importance of liquidity co-movement, we explore the effects of AT on 
commonality in liquidity. A priori, the relationship between AT and commonality in liquidity 
can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, AT reduces commonality in liquidity in 
normal market conditions. Existing research (Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; 
Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2012) suggests that algorithmic traders automate information 
gathering and processing and therefore are better informed than (slow) liquidity traders.
4
 A high 
level of firm-specific information acquisitions by algorithmic traders thus translates into low 
levels of co-movements with market-wide liquidity. Conceptually, this effect is similar to stock 
price non-synchronicity (i.e., low commonality in stock returns). In the spirit of Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), information trading or a transparent information environment corresponds to a 
lower level of stock price commonality because private information gets incorporated quickly 
into stock prices (Morck et al., 2000). Because information is a common driver of liquidity and 
stock returns,
5
 algorithmic traders should promptly process and act on information, which 
decreases commonality in liquidity.  
 On the other hand, AT may increase commonality in stock liquidity due to the correlated 
trading of algorithmic traders. That is, the strategies they adopt are more correlated than are 
those of non-algorithmic traders in the U.S. stock market (Brogaard, 2010) and foreign exchange 
markets (Chaboud et al., 2011). As support, Hendershott and Riordan (2013) find evidence of 
                                                 
4
 Brogaard (2010) empirically shows that HFT enhances stock price discovery on a sample of 120 Nasdaq stocks, in 
line with HFT’s capacity for the rapid processing of private information. Hendershott and Riordan (2013) 
investigate the 30 DAX stocks listed on the Deutsche Boerse and find consistent results. Jovanovic and Menkveld 
(2012) theoretically demonstrate that HFT is able to quickly update quotes on firm-specific news, and the authors 
empirically show that HFT entry is associated with a 23% decline in adverse selection costs. In terms of the nature 
of their collection of firm-specific information, algorithmic traders could either automate firm-specific news updates 
via specialized news analytical data vendors such as the RavenPack database or rely on their proprietary algorithms 
and computational advantage to gather and process firm-specific news at faster speed than human traders. 
5
 Karolyi et al. (2012) provide strong evidence that commonality in liquidity and commonality in stock returns are 
positively correlated over time in almost all 40 countries they study.  
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AT clustering in time in the 30 DAX stocks on the Deutsche Boerse. In addition, Coughenour 
and Saad (2004) document that commonality in stock liquidity tends to increase among stocks 
handled by the same market maker as a result of shared capital and information. Thus, we expect 
that commonality in stock liquidity increases with AT as previous evidence suggests that the 
market-making activity constitutes the lion’s share of AT trading volume (Hagströmer and 
Nordén, 2013; Menkveld, 2013). Given the opposing views about the role of AT on liquidity 
commonality, we investigate empirically how AT, on average, affects commonality in liquidity.  
2.3 LIQUIDITY EFFECT OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING IN EXTREME MARKET 
CONDITIONS  
The recent dominance of AT in many stock exchanges has provided an impetus for researchers 
to attempt to understand its effect, particularly on liquidity during periods of market stress. 
Several studies report positive effects of AT on liquidity, but the joint CFTC/SEC report on the 
U.S. flash crash of 6 May 2010 conveys the regulator’s concerns about the risk of AT when the 
market experiences high volatility.
6
 
 Prior literature offers few empirical insights into how algorithmic traders affect market 
liquidity during extreme market conditions. Kirilenko et al. (2011) examine HFT in the futures 
market around the flash crash of 6 May 2010 and find that although the traders did not trigger a 
crash, they exacerbated market volatility. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) study the market impact of 
HFT in June 2008 following the fire sale of Bear Stearns in March. They document that HFT 
enhances market quality during stressful market times. Instead of restricting their analysis to 
brief periods of extreme market events, Boehmer et al. (2015) and Zhang (2010) examine 
                                                 
6
 See http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf. 
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AT/HFT using a longer sample period with multiple market volatility episodes.
7
 They indicate 
that HFT worsens market quality around the world.  
We examine the AT behavior in TSE stocks during extreme market conditions, which we 
identify on the basis of the historic mean of the market index return (Hameed et al., 2010). 
However, unlike most prior research we use a longer sample period, rather than focus on specific 
events, to be representative of market conditions in general. We also analyze the effect of AT on 
commonality in liquidity during market stress whereby commonality in liquidity has been shown 
to increase.  
3. SAMPLE AND DATA DESCRIPTION  
3.1 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
According to annual statistics as at 2012, the TSE is the third largest exchange in terms of the 
total market capitalization of its listed firms at USD3,479 billion (World Federation of 
Exchanges, 2012). It thus ranks behind only the New York Stock Exchange at USD14,086 
billion and the NASDAQ OMX at USD4,582 billion. It also is the largest exchange to operate as 
a pure electronic order–driven market, without market makers; its turnover in 2012 was 
USD3,214 billion. The TS  operates two trading sessions each day: a morning session from 
9:00–11:00 am and an afternoon session from 12:30–3:00 pm. Similar to many order-driven 
markets with continuous trading, call auctions open and close trading for each session.  
                                                 
7
 Specifically, Zhang (2010) studies all stocks covered by CRSP and Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
databases during 1995–2009 and finds that the positive correlation between HFT and market volatility increases 
with greater market uncertainty, on basis of the S&P 500 VIX implied volatility index. Boehmer et al. (2015) use the 
AT proxy from Hendershott et al. (2011) on an international sample of stocks from 39 exchanges from 2001 to 2009 
and show that AT lessens market liquidity and worsens market volatility when market making is difficult.  
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 The TSE introduced a new trading platform, Arrowhead, on 4 January 2010, with the 
specific aim of facilitating AT on the Japanese stock market. The Arrowhead trading system is 
built on an optical fiber ring network and has reduced latency (i.e., the time elapsed between 
order placement and order execution) to two milliseconds on average. The new trading speed is 
approximately one-thousandth of the time required under the previous trading system (Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, 2010) and is similar to that of the NYSE and the LSE. Depending on their 
physical distance from the TSE data center, market participants can experience additional 
latency. To minimize latency, participants can use the co-location service and install automatic 
order placement servers at the TSE data center, thus gaining even lower latency of less than one 
millisecond (Asia ETrading, 2014; Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2011).  
        The structure of the monthly access fee was changed when TSE implemented the new 
trading platform. Under the previous trading system, the monthly access fee for the trading 
platform was charged based on a tier system, beginning at 400 thousand yen for participants 
submitting fewer than 100,000 orders per month. The maximum monthly fee of 6,600 thousand 
yen was charged for a submission of 4 million orders or more. In anticipation of the larger 
number of order submissions under Arrowhead, the fee structure was amended, with the TSE no 
longer capping their monthly access fees. The TSE continues to use the tiered fee structure, but 
new tiers have been introduced. For instance, participants submitting between 5 million and 10 
million orders per month are charged 7,100 thousand yen, and when participants submit more 
than 10 million orders, TSE now charges 500 thousand yen per 5 million orders. 
         Together with the implementation of the new trading platform, the TSE amended its 
trading rules. Of particular importance to our study is the change in the tick size structure; the 
introduction of more tick size intervals increased the number of intervals from 9 to 11 and 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 
15 
 
decreased the tick size for stocks in these price zones.
8
 For example, the tick size for stocks 
trading in the price range of 3,000 to 5,000 yen fell from 10 to 5 yen. This change may cause a 
decrease in the bid–ask spread for affected stocks; to ensure a clean sample, we exclude the 
affected stocks throughout the analysis.  
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
We construct AT and stock liquidity measures using intraday transactions data obtained from the 
Nikkei Economic Electronic Database System. The database comprises real-time tick-by-tick 
data for all stocks listed on the TSE, where the transaction records are time-stamped to the 
nearest minute prior to January 2010 and to the nearest second after January 2010. Price, order 
flow, and volume information are available for a wide spectrum of common stocks in Japan. This 
detailed, comprehensive database is the best known trading data source on the Japan market and 
has been used widely in previous studies (e.g., Ahn et al., 2005; Ohta, 2006).  
 Due to the scarce AT activities in the years prior to 2010, our sample period runs from 
January 2007 to December 2012.
9
 We focus on common stocks listed on the TSE and apply 
several filters to form the final sample. First, we exclude trading days without afternoon sessions 
                                                 
8
 Prior to 2010, the price (in JPY) and minimum tick size (in parentheses) were ≤2,000, (1); ≤3,000, (5); ≤30,000, 
(10); ≤50,000, (50); ≤300,000, (100); ≤3,000,000, (1000); ≤20,000,000, (10,000); ≤30,000,000, (50,000); 
and >30,000,000, (100,000). With the implementation of the Arrowhead trading platform, the price (in JPY) and 
minimum tick size (in parentheses) became ≤3,000, (1); ≤5,000, (5); ≤30,000, (10); ≤50,000, (50); ≤300,000, (100); 
≤500,000, (500); ≤3,000,000, (1000); ≤5,000,000, (5000); ≤30,000,000, (10,000); ≤50,000,000, (50,000); 
and >50,000,000, (100,000).  
9
 AT is an outcome of recent advances in technology. Chaboud et al. (2011) observe a very small portion of AT 
prior to 2006 in foreign exchange markets. Hendershott et al. (2011) also show a sharp increase in AT after January 
2003, which coincided with the introduction of Autoquote on the NYSE, where new quotes are automatically 
disseminated when there was a relevant change to the limit order book. The TSE introduced Arrowhead on 4 
January 2010 to boost automated trading in the Japanese market. Before then, AT was limited by trading platform 
capacity constraints.  
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to avoid the holiday effects.
10
 Second, to mitigate bid–ask bounce concerns, we omit stocks with 
a price of less than 10 Japanese yen. Third, we exclude stock-day observations if the stock on a 
particular day has less than five trades executed in a continuous auction session with positive bid 
and ask prices. Fourth, we exclude the specific daily spread measure if its value on a particular 
day is greater than 20%. Fifth, we drop stocks that have experienced tick size reduction 
following the introduction of the Arrowhead trading platform. After applying these filters, our 
final sample consists of 1,572,355 stock-day observations from 1,302 unique stocks spanning 
1,471 trading days.  
3.3 ALGORITHMIC TRADING MEASURE 
Since we cannot differentiate orders placed by a computer from those placed by humans, in this 
study we use electronic message traffic as a proxy for AT. We define electronic message traffic 
as the sum of quote updates on a given trading day. This AT proxy has received strong support 
from existing literature. Biais and Weill (2009) provide theoretical support for this measure by 
demonstrating that the ratio of electronic messages to volume rises with the rate at which 
investors can contact the market. Empirically, this measure has been applied by Hendershott et al. 
(2011) to a U.S. sample and by Boehmer et al. (2015) to an international sample.  
 A caveat associated with the use of a raw electronic message traffic measure is that this 
measure rises with trading volume, even if AT remains stable (see Figure 1), leading to a 
spurious relationship between AT and electronic message traffic. To avoid misleading 
interpretations, we normalize electronic message traffic by dividing the dollar trading volume by 
                                                 
10
 In Japan, stock trading in the afternoon session was suspended the day prior to major national festivals, namely, in 
our sample, on 4 January 2007, 28 December 2007, 4 January 2008, 30 December 2008, and 5 January 2009. The 
implementation of the new trading system eliminated these half-holidays. 
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the aggregate electronic message traffic on a given trading day and multiplying this ratio by –1 
and denote this variable as ATrade.
11
 The theoretical boundary of ATrade is between negative 
infinity and zero. A higher value of ATrade indicates a higher level of AT. Table 1 summarizes 
our descriptive variable statistics; consistent with the time trend in Figure 1, the mean and 
median value of ATrade increases steadily over our sample period with a sharp jump from 2009 
to 2010. The mean value of ATrade increases from a low of –0.27 in 2007 to a high of –0.06 in 
2012, and the medians exhibit similar upward patterns.  
3.4 LIQUIDITY MEASURES  
The challenge associated with measuring stock liquidity is long standing (Goyenko et al., 2009; 
Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). In an attempt to disentangle the effects of AT on various aspects of 
stock liquidity, we adopt six liquidity measures: quoted spread, effective spread, realized spread, 
adverse selection cost measure, market depth at the best bid/ask prices, and aggregated market 
depth at the first five price levels. Noting the persistence of seasonality effects across liquidity 
measures, we compute adjusted stock liquidity measures, similar to those used by Hameed et al. 
(2010), though with one modification; that is, we include price zone dummies. Specifically, we 
adjust our liquidity measures for stock i on day t as follows:
 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑑𝑗
4
𝑗=1
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑚𝑗
11
𝑗=1
𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑝𝑗
10
𝑗=1
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
                                                 
11
 AT often manifests itself in active order submission, cancellation, and execution. Suppose AT activity has been 
stable but overall order executions have increased in response to positive news events, resulting in a higher value of 
both the raw electronic message measure and trading volume. In this case, the increased raw electronic message 
measure does not necessarily correspond to a rise in AT. This concern can be effectively alleviated using the 
electronic message measure adjusted for trading volume. Moreover, the adjusted message traffic measure 
normalized by trading volume also enables cross-sectional and time series comparisons. This is essential for our 
study which spans a long sample period from 2007 to 2012. 
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where 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is the day of the week dummy, 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡  is the month dummy, and 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
denotes the price zone dummy. We run this regression model for each stock throughout the 
sample period and use the estimated residual, including the intercept, 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡  , to measure 
stock liquidity in our subsequent empirical analyses.  
 The first two liquidity measures, quoted spread and effective spread, reflect aggregate 
stock liquidity. Quoted spread refers to the difference between the bid and ask price, scaled by 
the midpoint of bid and ask prices in each transaction. The effective spread for stock i on the jth 
transaction can be computed as follows:  
𝐸𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑗(𝑃𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑗)/𝑀𝑖,𝑗 (2) 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 equals 1 if the trade is buyer-initiated and –1 if seller-initiated; 𝑃𝑖,𝑗  is the trade price; 
and 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 refers to the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. Because the TSE is an order-driven 
market and all transactions occur at the best bid or ask prices, the initiator of a transaction can be 
identified with certainty. According to the summary statistics of these two spread measures in 
Table 1,
12
 the sample mean values of the quoted and effective spread measures are 0.0033 and 
0.0027, respectively, largely comparable with their U.S. counterparts (Goyenko et al., 2009). 
This indicates that the Japanese stock market is highly liquid and it thus serves as an appropriate 
environment for AT. Additionally, the time patterns of the two spread measures coincide with 
significant global and domestic financial events during the same period. For example, the mean 
quoted spread reaches its highest level of 0.0040 in 2008, at the onset of the global financial 
                                                 
12
 The spread measures in Table 1 are multiplied by 10
4
 for presentation.  
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crisis, and declines to 0.0031 in 2012 due to the resilient financial recovery (e.g., Campello et al., 
2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Lang and Maffett, 2011).
13
  
 To investigate how AT affects stock liquidity, we decompose effective spread into its 
inventory component (i.e., revenues for liquidity providers) and adverse selection component 
(i.e., gross losses to informed liquidity demanders). The former can be measured by the realized 
spread over the five-minute time interval; the latter is measured by the price impact of a trade 
over the same time interval. The realized spread, RSpread, for stock i on the jth transaction is 
defined as:  
𝑅𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑗(𝑃𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑗+5)/𝑀𝑖,𝑗 (3) 
where 𝑀𝑖,𝑗+5 refers to the midpoint of the prevailing bid and ask prices at time of the subsequent 
trade five minutes after trade j.
14
 The adverse selection component of stock liquidity is measured 
as follows:  
𝐴𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑗(𝑀𝑖,𝑗+5 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑗)/𝑀𝑖,𝑗 (4) 
For each spread measure for each stock on each day, we calculate the dollar volume weighted 
average across all trades that day. From Table 1, we observe a consistent pattern across the year 
subsamples. That is, the magnitude of the adverse selection component of stock liquidity is much 
higher than that of realized spread, which highlights the significance of information-based 
trading activities.  
                                                 
13
 The global financial crisis, stemming from the U.S. banking sector, spurs renewed interest in various finance and 
economics issues; most studies, including Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Campello et al. (2010), and Lang and 
Maffett (2011) identify 2008 as the year of the onset of the crisis.  
14
 Following Huang and Stoll (1996), we use the prevailing best quotes for the first trade occurring five minutes after 
trade j in the same trading session (i.e., morning or afternoon session) if a trade is not available after five minutes. 
No realized spread is calculated if no subsequent trade exists in the same trading session. 
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 Finally, we explore market depth at the best bid and ask prices and at the aggregated five-
level market depth on the limit order book. We define market depth, Depth, as the total dollar 
value of shares available at the best bid/ask prices; the five-level market depth, Depth5, is the 
total dollar value of shares available at the best five levels of quoted prices. For each stock on 
each day, we calculate the average time-weighted market depth and express the measure in 
millions of Japanese yen. Table 1 reports means, for the entire sample period 2007-2012, for 
Depth and Depth5 of 18.31 and 89.22, respectively. The finding that Depth5 is less than five 
times the mean of Depth suggests greater market depth occurs at the best available quoted prices 
than at other levels. We plot the time-series of daily cross-sectional averages of our daily AT 
measure, ATrade, daily quoted spread (QSpread) and market depth (Depth) in Graph (a) of 
Figure 2. Together with the increase in AT activities from January 2010, we find that the cross-
sectional average of daily quoted spread has declined and that of market depth has increased post 
the adoption of Arrowhead in 2010. We also note that the average quoted spread is relatively 
higher and more volatile during the global financial crisis period in 2008. The spike in market 
depth and quoted spread around March 2011 corresponds to the outbreak of the 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake on 11 March 2011.  
3.5 CONTROL VARIABLES  
To ensure that the observed relationships between the ATrade measure and stock liquidity are not 
driven by other stock characteristics and market-wide conditions, we control for four stock-level 
variables and three market-level variables; their detailed definitions are shown in the Appendix. 
The stock-level variables include stock turnover (Turn), daily stock volatility (Vol), the inverse 
of stock price multiplied by 100 (InvPrc), and the log of market capitalization (Size). Stock 
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turnover refers to the number of shares traded, over the number of shares outstanding on a given 
trading day. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show the bid–ask spread widens as the trading 
volume and number of shareholders decrease, which they attribute to a clientele effect. In 
controlling for stock turnover in our analysis, we expect this variable to be negatively associated 
with spread measures but positively related to market depth measures.  
 Substantial literature offers evidence of worsening stock liquidity during volatile stock 
markets. Therefore, we control for stock volatility, computed as the difference between high and 
low stock prices over a given trading day (Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Chordia et al., 2000). 
We predict that daily stock volatility has a negative relationship with stock liquidity measures. 
We further control for the inverse of stock price; Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978) 
report that stock transactions costs relate negatively to stock price. Finally, we account for firm 
size, measured by the natural log of market capitalization on a particular trading day.  
           The three control variables that proxy for market conditions are Japanese stock market 
return (MRet), realized market volatility (MVol) and expected future market volatility (VXJ).
15
 In 
particular, expected stock market volatility is measured using the Volatility Index Japan index 
(VXJ) provided by the VXJ Research Group at the Center for the Study of Finance and Insurance 
from Osaka University. This measure is calculated on a daily basis following the VIX 
methodology as an index of market volatility implicit in the prices of Nikkei 225 options traded 
                                                 
15
 While we have controlled for several commonly used market variables, our results may still be driven by other 
unobservable time series variables. Because it is considerably challenging to find an appropriate control sample, we 
cannot completely resolve the endogeneity concern in our research setting. 
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at the Osaka Securities Exchange. We expect this index to capture the funding constraints for 
liquidity providers (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Nagel, 2012).
16
 
 With all these variables winsorized at the top and bottom 0.05% of the full sample 
distribution, several interesting findings in Table 1 are noteworthy. The sample mean of daily 
stock turnover (i.e., Turn divided by 1,000) is 0.0039, consistent with TSE being a liquid stock 
market. Stock volatility, Vol, exhibits the highest mean value of 0.21 and a standard deviation of 
1.96 in 2008 when the global financial crisis broke out.  
4. ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND STOCK LIQUIDITY 
Algorithmic traders can act differently, as either liquidity providers or liquidity demanders. 
Considering the dynamic nature of their algorithms, it remains unanswered whether and how 
algorithmic trading affects stock liquidity and commonality in liquidity in a limit order–driven 
market. We explore this research question in depth by analyzing the statistical and economic 
impact of AT on six different liquidity measures.  
4.1 MAIN REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
We first investigate the direct effect of AT on stock liquidity from 2007 to 2012 by estimating 
the following structural equations using the 2SLS regression method:  
,, 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
7 8 ,
_
                    
     
  
       
 
i ti t i i t i t i t i t t
t t i t
Adj liq s ATrade Turn Vol InvPrc Size MRet
MVol VXJ
 (5a) 
, 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
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t t t i t
ATrade v Arrowhead Turn Vol InvPrc Size
MRet MVol VXJ
    
   
      
  
 (5b) 
                                                 
16
 The information about the VXJ index is obtained from the following website: http://www-csfi.sigmath.es.osaka-
u.ac.jp/en/activity/vxj_method.php?id=3. 
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where 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡  denotes various adjusted spread and depth measures, and 𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the 
negative daily dollar trading volume scaled by the total number of quote updates for stock i on 
day t. 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡  is the instrumental variable in the first stage regression as specified by 
Equation (5b). This is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the observation is on or after 
4 January, 2010 and zero otherwise. The list of control variables includes stock trading turnover 
(Turn), daily stock trading volatility (Vol), the inverse of stock price ( nvPrc), firm size (Size), 
stock market return (MRet), realized market volatility (MVol) and expected market volatility 
(VXJ). We also include firm fixed effects (i.e., is  and iv ) to control for any omitted firm-level 
control variables.  
Table 2 Panel A contains the 2SLS regression results from estimating Equations (5a) and 
(5b) with the full sample. We first check the validity of using the 2SLS regression methods by 
performing the Hausman test. The p-values of the Hausman tests are less than 5%, across all 
model specifications, suggesting the use of the 2SLS regression is more appropriate than the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In the first stage regressions, there is strong and 
consistent evidence across all the 2SLS estimations that the adoption of the Arrowhead trading 
platform has facilitated algorithmic trading activities. For example, in column (1), the coefficient 
of Arrowhead is 0.090 (t-statistic = 227.310), indicating that AT has increased substantially post 
the implementation of the new trading platform. In the second stage estimations, we observe 
significant coefficients on the ATrade variable across four different stock liquidity measures. 
When quoted spread and effective spread are used as dependent variables in columns (2) and (4), 
the coefficients on ATrade are -14.298 (t-statistic = -35.750) and -3.089 (t-statistic = -10.792), 
respectively. From an economic perspective, a one standard deviation increase in ATrade leads 
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to a 4.00 basis point decrease in quoted spread and a 0.86 basis point decrease in effective 
spread. Because the mean of the quoted and effective spreads falls between 27 and 32 basis 
points, the impact of AT on stock liquidity is economically significant. Consistent with the 
results using spread-based variables, columns (6) and (8) show that ATrade is positively and 
significantly associated with both of the market depth measures, suggesting an increased market 
depth with the rise of AT.  
Our results also suggest a reliable control variable selection. When spread-based liquidity 
measures are used as dependent variables, all control variables are statistically significant, and 
the sign on the coefficients is consistent with our expectations. Stock turnover relates negatively 
to the spread-based illiquidity measure, in line with the clientele effect suggested by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986). We also find that all spread-based illiquidity measures increase with stock 
volatility and the inverse of stock price but decrease with firm size. Finally, spreads narrow on 
days with high market returns and widen on days with high realized and expected market 
volatility. With regard to the model specifications, using market depth measures as dependent 
variables, the sign on the coefficients for Size and VXJ reverses, which is consistent with 
expectations for the level of market depth to be higher for large sized stocks and lower on days 
with high expected market volatility.  
According to classic market microstructure models, information asymmetry and 
inventory risk are considered as major components of trading costs. Algorithmic traders’ 
exposure to these two risks is likely to differ when compared to other traders. Their access to 
speed allows for more rapid (instantaneous) processing of public news (Biais et al., 2012; 
Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2012), and thereby reduces the risk of these traders being adversely 
selected. The ability to attenuate their adverse selection costs is likely to see AT improve 
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liquidity through the submission of more aggressive limit orders. Inventory costs, a proxy for 
order execution costs after excluding adverse selection costs (Bessembinder, 2003; Huang and 
Stoll, 1996), may also decline with the rise of AT. The use of computerized trading enables 
algorithmic traders to quickly update their quotes and thus increase the competition among 
liquidity providers, shrinking the revenues from liquidity provision.  
Using data for the entire time period, we evaluate the effects of AT on adverse selection 
and inventory costs in Table 2 Panel B. Our results show that the coefficients on ATrade are -
2.293 (t-statistic = -5.403) for realized spread in column (2), and -1.501 (t-statistic = -3.518) for 
adverse selection cost in column (4). The magnitude of the ATrade coefficient for realized spread 
is much larger than the magnitude of that for the adverse selection cost, which is consistent with 
the findings in prior research that algorithmic traders are more likely to take on a market making 
role rather than exploit any informational advantages (Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013; Menkveld, 
2013).    
4.2 SOURCE OF THE EFFECTS OF AT ON STOCK LIQUIDITY   
Among other possibilities, we attempt to explore one possible mechanism by which AT leads to 
an improvement in stock liquidity: the reduction in monitoring costs. AT could either automate 
the monitoring of stocks
17
 or gather and process public available news instantaneously (Carrion, 
2013), both of which markedly reduce the monitoring costs. We first use firm size as a proxy for 
the level of monitoring costs. It is argued that small stocks receive little investor attention (Hong 
                                                 
17
 Some databases provide real-time quantifiable assessments of firm-specific and market-wide news for algorithmic 
traders. As a prominent example, RavenPack News Analytics can analyze the news relevance and sentiment 
instantaneously to help their algorithmic customers predict liquidity, volatility, and directional market movements 
caused by news and assist to establish automated market-making strategies when there is a significant news 
impacting event on a particular stock. See RavenPack’s website for more details: http://www.ravenpack.com/.   
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et al., 2000), have a lower quality of financial reporting (Dechow and Dichev, 2002)
18
, release 
less public information, and have a lower extent of financial press coverage (Gadarowski, 
2002).
19
 Therefore, the monitoring costs of small stocks are expected to be higher than those of 
large stocks.  
The 2SLS regression models involving interaction terms are more complicated 
empirically. Because ATrade is an endogenous predictor in the second-stage model, any 
interaction between this endogenous predictor and an exogenous variable such as Size is 
potentially endogenous. In cases where the second-stage model involves multiple endogenous 
predictors, it is important to satisfy the rank condition (Wooldridge, 2002, p.88) whereby there 
must be at least one instrument included for each endogenous predictor in the second stage. 
Following Murnane and Willett (2011), p.247, we use the Arrowhead dummy variable and the 
interaction between Arrowhead and Size as the instruments for ATrade and the interaction 
between ATrade and Size. Specifically, we regress ATrade and ATrade×Size, respectively, on 
Arrowhead and Arrowhead×Size together with other controls in the two first stage regressions. 
The predicted values of ATrade and ATrade×Size are used in the second stage.  
The second stage results are summarized in Table 3 Panel A. We note that the coefficients 
on ATrade×Size are positive and significant at the 1% level for the spread measures in columns 
(1) and (2), and are negative and significant for the depth measures in columns (3) and (4). The 
                                                 
18
 Hong et al. (2000) suggest that private information travels faster for large stocks due to the fact that investors 
collecting private information are faced with the fixed costs of information acquisitions. As a result, they are more 
inclined to devote more efforts to stocks that can take strong positions. Another strand of the rich literature on 
financial accounting quality (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002) supports the view that financial accounting quality is 
relatively high for large stocks. 
19
 Analysts collect, filter and disseminate information about firms. They cover large stocks instead of small stocks 
because there is a high demand for analyst service from institutional investors who trade stocks that are in the index 
funds. They cover large stocks also because the cost of collecting non-public information is lower for large stocks. 
The relation between firm size and the level of analyst coverage is supported by the empirical findings of Bhushan 
(1989), Hong et al. (2000) and Rock et al. (2000).  
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evidence suggests that the effect of AT is most pronounced among small stocks that are likely to 
have high monitoring costs, which is in support of the idea that AT improves liquidity through 
reducing monitoring costs.   
In addition to firm size, we also use two measures that are more direct proxies of 
monitoring costs: financial analyst coverage (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and the number of public 
news releases (Griffin et al., 2011); lower values of these two proxies represent higher levels of 
monitoring costs. We measure analyst coverage by the number of financial analyst forecasts in 
the three months prior to financial year end (denoted as Analyst) based on the information 
provided by the I/B/E/S database; to avoid unnecessary loss of data, we assign this variable the 
value of zero for stocks that are not included in the database. Consistent with prior results, we 
find in Panel B that after controlling for firm size, the liquidity effects of ATrade are 
significantly stronger for firms with low level of analyst coverage across all the liquidity 
measures. We capture firm-level public news events using the number of public news messages 
on a given trading day in the Thomson Reuters News database.
20
 Again, the results in Panel C 
show that the effects of ATrade are more pronounced for firms with low level of public media 
coverage. The overall findings in this table suggest that the reduction of monitoring costs can be 
a potential explanation as to why AT improves stock liquidity.  
At this juncture, it is necessary to review the size effect of AT activity documented in prior 
studies. Jain et al. (2012, Table 1) observe a more pronounced AT effect in improving liquidity 
in large-cap stocks from a simple univariate analysis using the TSE sample like us.  At the first 
glance, our results seem to contradict their findings. However, a meaningful comparison is 
                                                 
20
 The number of news messages for the stock on day t includes news release from the previous day closing time to 
the closing on day t. 
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difficult due to several reasons. Jain et al. (2012) differs substantially from our study in terms of 
the liquidity measures, AT proxy, and estimation approach. Even without these differences, they 
do not test explicitly the size effect in their multivariate analysis.
21
 The inference from their 
multivariate analysis is at best a positive relationship between AT and liquidity across all size 
groups, consistent with our findings.  
 
      The size effect on the AT-market quality relationship is also examined but not 
tabulated in Hasbrouck and Saar (2013, page 673). Although they do not observe any consistent 
pattern in the size quantiles during normal times (the 2007 sample), the authors report a stronger 
AT effect on volatility reduction in smaller stocks in the 2008 sample. They interpret the results 
as high volatility attracting AT in small-cap stocks. Considering our findings of a stronger AT 
effect in smaller stocks and informationally opaque stocks, our study extends Hasbrouck and 
Saar’s findings by highlighting the reduction in monitoring costs as a potential economic channel 
for the stronger negative AT-volatility relationship in smaller stocks.      
4.3 ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND COMMONALITY IN STOCK LIQUIDITY  
Commonality in liquidity is another important dimension of stock liquidity. When individual 
stock liquidity moves together with market-wide liquidity and cannot be diversified away, 
systematic liquidity risk results. We analyze whether AT plays a role in determining 
commonality in liquidity in Table 4. To start, we obtain a proxy for commonality in liquidity by 
estimating the following regression model on a monthly basis for each stock:  
                                                 
21
 While the magnitude of the Arrowhead variable does appear to decline from large-cap stocks to small-cap stocks 
in Table 3 of Jain et al. (2012) when regressing COI and LOB slope on the Arrowhead dummy variable, such a 
comparison is arbitrary without any statistical grounds. It is therefore no surprise that the authors did not remark on 
the size effect on the AT-liquidity relationship in their multivariate analysis at all.  
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 ∆𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡∆𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑞−𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
where  ∆𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the change in individual stock liquidity for stock i on day t, and  ∆𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑞−𝑖,𝑡 is 
the change in market liquidity, which is the simple average of the corresponding individual stock 
liquidity measure across all stocks except stock i on day t. The R-squared estimates from 
Equation (6) represent the co-movement of individual stock liquidity with market-wide liquidity. 
To ensure a reliable R-squared estimate, we exclude the monthly estimates from our subsequent 
analysis if there are less than 15 stock-day observations in a particular month. In addition, due to 
the bounded nature of R-square estimates, we divide R-squared by (1 – R-squared) and take the 
log of this ratio (Hameed et al., 2010; Karolyi et al., 2012).
22
  To visualize the relationship 
between AT and commonality in liquidity, we plot the time series of the cross-sectional averages 
of monthly ATrade, commonality in quoted spread (CQSpread), and commonality in market 
depth (CDepth) in Graph (b) of Figure 2. We note that CQSpread and CDepth are relatively high 
during the global financial crisis in 2008 and the spike in March 2011 is due to the great 
earthquake in Japan. However, it is difficult to distinguish a clear pattern between ATrade and 
two commonality variables from the graph.  
          To investigate the effect of AT on commonality in liquidity, we then use the following 
2SLS equations controlling for the endogeneity of AT: 
 
                                                 
22
 The mean values of the raw R-squared estimates range from 0.083 (CDepth) to 0.128 (CQSpread), and their 
medians are within a similar range. The mean values of the logistically transformed R-squared estimates are between 
-3.605 (CDepth) and -2.976 (CQSpread), and their median values are between -3.152 (CDepth) and -2.534 
(CQSpread). For robustness, we also rerun our analyses using the original R-squared measures estimated from 
Equation (6) and our results continue to hold.  
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, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 5 6 ,i t i i t i t i t t t t i tCLiq s ATrade Liq Size MRet MVol VXJ               (7a) 
, 1 2 , 3 , 4 5 6 ,i t i t i t i t t t t i tATrade v Arrowhead Liq Size MRet MVol VXJ               (7b) 
 
where CLiq represents the logistically transformed monthly estimates of commonality from 
Equation (6) in four stock liquidity measures: quoted spread (QSpread), effective spread 
(ESpread), market depth at best bid and ask prices (Depth), and aggregated market depth at five 
price levels (Depth5). All other variables in Equations (7a) and (7b) are the monthly averages of 
their daily measures defined in Equations (5a) and (5b).  
 Table 4 summarizes the results. Across all liquidity measures, we observe positive and 
significant coefficients on the Arrowhead dummy variable in the first-stage regressions. As for 
the second-stage model estimation, the coefficient on ATrade ranges from 2.997 to 4.302 across 
the four liquidity measures, with all coefficients significant at the 1% level. The results suggest 
that AT increases individual stock liquidity co-movement with market liquidity, which might 
occur if algorithmic traders are trading a basket of stocks when using correlated trading strategies 
(Brogaard, 2010; Menkveld, 2013). It is also possible if the majority of algorithmic traders act as 
new market makers. Each market maker provides liquidity for more than one stock; Coughenour 
and Saad (2004) document that stock liquidity co-move with the liquidity of other stocks handled 
by the same market maker because of shared capital and information. The signs on the 
coefficients for the control variables are mostly consistent with prior literature. We find the 
liquidity commonality measures increase with firm size (Size) and market volatility (MVol). 
There are, however, three control variables  (MRet, VXJ and QSpread) that have coefficients 
with signs contrary to our expectations in some of the models. First, the coefficients on expected 
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market volatility (VXJ) are negative and significant for the regressions examining commonality 
in quoted and effective spreads, and the coefficient on market return (MRet) is positive in the 
regression model examining commonality in market depth (CDepth5). This could be attributed to 
the multicollinearity problem arising from the high correlations between VXJ and MRet/MVol 
(the correlation coefficient between VXJ and MRet is -0.41; the correlation coefficient between 
VXJ and MVol is 0.60). In untabulated results, we find positive coefficients on VXJ when MRet 
and MVol are excluded; and more importantly, our primary results remain unaffected after 
excluding VXJ from the regression estimation. Second, we observe a negative coefficient on 
QSpread in column (2), which suggests that commonality in quoted spread decreases with 
quoted spread. The puzzling result for the coefficient on QSpread may be driven by small stocks 
that usually experience wide quoted spreads and low commonality in liquidity simultaneously 
(the correlation coefficient between Size and QSpread is -0.54). We run the model without 
controlling for QSpread and the untabulated results show that the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient on ATrade remain similar.   
 To verify the robustness of our full sample results, we conduct an additional test and 
present the results in Panel B. We test whether our results hold when examining commonality in 
liquidity using intraday data. We investigate the effects of AT on intraday commonality 
measures for two reasons: (1) the inter-day findings may not extend to the intraday analysis if 
trading by algorithmic traders across different stocks occurs at different times of the day; (2) 
prior studies (see Huh, 2011; Jain et al., 2012) document evidence of positive associations 
between AT and intraday liquidity commonality and we are keen to verify these findings with 
our sample and measures. To examine whether the effect of AT holds for intraday liquidity co-
movement, we re-estimate the four liquidity measures by using 1-minute snapshot data. The 
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changes in the 1-minute liquidity measures are then regressed on the changes in the respective 1-
minute market-level liquidity measure (excluding the own stock) based on Equation (6) for all 
liquidity measures within a given trading day. This allows us to generate intraday commonality 
in liquidity measures at a daily frequency. We then estimate Equations (7a) and (7b) based on 
daily observations. Summarizing the second-stage regression results in columns (1)-(4) in Table 
4 Panel B, we note that the effects of AT on the intraday commonality in liquidity are positive 
and significant across all the intraday commonality measures, largely consistent with its effects 
on the low-frequency commonality in liquidity.  
               We further look at whether the reduction in monitoring costs leads to the positive effect 
of AT on liquidity commonality. If algorithmic traders are able to monitor firm-specific news 
more quickly and efficiently, we expect the effects of AT to be more pronounced for smaller 
firms and firms with fewer analyst following and lower media coverage as such firms often incur 
high monitoring costs. In other words, stocks that incur high monitoring costs are more likely to 
be included in the trading portfolio of algorithmic traders following the rise of AT, and therefore 
exhibit high commonality in liquidity. To test this effect, we introduce an interaction term 
between ATrade and the three proxies for monitoring costs (i.e., firm size, analyst and news 
coverage) in the baseline 2SLS regression models (Equations (7a) and (7b)). The second-stage 
regression results shown in Table 5 support this conjecture. The coefficients on ATrade×Size, 
ATrade×Analyst, and ATrade×News are negative and significant at conventional levels for all 
four liquidity commonality measures in Panels A, B and C, respectively. This suggests that 
stocks with high monitoring costs experience the most significant increase in liquidity 
commonality due to AT.   
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4.4 ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND STOCK LIQUIDITY IN EXTREME MARKET 
CONDITIONS  
Noting the generally positive effect of AT on stock liquidity during normal market conditions, 
we investigate whether such effects persist in extreme market conditions. By many accounts, 
practitioners have unfavorable views of AT; the financial press often suggests that algorithmic 
traders take the same side on transactions in times of high market volatility and therefore 
exacerbate market quality.
23
 Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the effects of AT during extreme 
market conditions. 
We first examine the changes of AT activities in extreme market conditions in Table 6, 
and then investigate variations in the effects of AT on stock liquidity and liquidity commonality 
in extreme market conditions in Table 7. We use Hameed et al.’s (2010) criteria to identify 
extreme market conditions: A trading day is in an extreme market if the previous week’s market 
return, proxied by the TOPIX market index, is more than 1.5 times the standard deviation above 
or below its unconditional mean. The unconditional mean and standard deviation of local market 
returns for a particular day are determined with a rolling window approach, which computes the 
basic statistics using 52 weekly historical market returns, prior to the particular trading day. By 
using a rolling window approach, we avoid an uneven distribution of extreme high and low 
market returns in certain calendar years, such as 2008. 
 The number of trading days with extreme market conditions in each year and over the full 
sample period is reported in Table 6 Panel A. We denote the days with highly positive (negative) 
market returns as Up (Down) market states. The highest number of extreme market increases and 
                                                 
23
 For example, “Algorithmic trades heighten volatility,” Financial Times, December 4, 2008 (Gangahar, 2008).  
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declines occurs in 2008, with 22 days of extremely high market returns and 32 days of extremely 
low market returns. This volatile stock market is clearly affected by the far-reaching 2008 global 
financial crisis. The years 2010 and 2011 have the fewest days with highly positive market 
returns. The year with the fewest days with extremely low market returns is 2009, which is 
consistent with expectations associated with a gradual market recovery after the 2008 financial 
crisis. The average market returns for the Up and Down market states are 0.063 and –0.068, 
respectively, which indicate the magnitude of the extreme market conditions. More importantly, 
the Down dummy variable largely coincides with prominent negative events in global and 
Japanese stock markets. For instance, we find that Down days include 16 September 2008, 
following the overnight news that Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy, as well as the 2-10 
October 2008 period, when the global market plummeted in fear of a pervasive global financial 
crisis in the wake of the large investment bank’s fall. The Down dummy variable is also equal to 
one for the 11-16 March 2011 period, during which the 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred on 11 
March and news of the nuclear plant accident was released on 14 March.  
 In Panel B, we explore whether AT activities change with market conditions by 
regressing ATrade on the absolute value of market returns, the interaction terms between local 
market returns and extreme market condition dummy variables (Up and Down). We note that the 
coefficient on |MRet| is 0.102 (t-statistic = 7.629) after including the interactions terms, 
MRet×Up and MRet×Down, in column (2). This suggests that on average, AT increases with 
market movement. Analyzing the extreme market conditions, however, offers a different 
message: The coefficients on MRet×Up and MRet×Down are –0.122 (t-statistic = -6.950) and 
0.193 (t-statistic =10.404), respectively, suggesting a decrease in AT during extreme market 
conditions. To mitigate concerns that the results are driven by market returns having large 
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outliers, we replace |MRet| with its rank values (denoted as RAMRet) and use the rank values in 
the interaction terms. With this specification, we continue to find that algorithmic traders curtail 
their trading when the market is under stress (i.e., during extreme down market conditions) but 
not when the market is performing well.  
             Next, we turn to ask how algorithmic traders affect individual stock liquidity and 
liquidity commonality during extreme market condition. Specifically, we regress the four 
liquidity measures and four commonality measures on the Arrowhead dummy variable and its 
interactions with the Up and Down dummies and report the results in Table 7. We note that the 
coefficients on Arrowhead×Down are 4.084 (t-statistic = 18.163) and 3.244 (t-statistic = 22.052) 
for QSpread and ESpread, respectively. Given the coefficients on Arrowhead are -1.650 for 
QSpread and -0.579 for ESpread, the collective evidence suggests that AT widens spreads when 
the stock market is under stress. The results for Depth and Depth5 paint a similar picture. The 
coefficients on Arrowhead×Down are -4.149 (t-statistic = -2.847) and -15.972 (t-statistic = -
5.146) for Depth and Depth5, respectively. Combined with the coefficients on Arrowhead (5.281 
for Depth and 22.850 for Depth5), our results suggest that while AT is associated with 
improvement in market depth, their contribution to market depth is less so in down market 
conditions.   
 We examine the effect of AT on liquidity commonality for extreme market states in 
Table 7 Panel B. Because our liquidity commonality measures are computed monthly, we adjust 
the definitions of the Up and Down state dummies as follows: Up (Down) equals one if the 
monthly market return, proxied by the TOPIX index return, is 1.5 standard deviations above 
(below) the unconditional mean of the 12 monthly market returns in the past year, and zero 
otherwise. Using liquidity measured by quoted and effective spread, we note positive and 
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statistically significant coefficients on the interaction terms Arrowhead×Up and 
Arrowhead×Down across all liquidity commonality measures. The results suggest that AT 
increases commonality in liquidity in both up and down market states. This is particularly 
worrisome for the down market states where market liquidity is typically scarce and 
commonality in liquidity intensifies.  
4.5 DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF ARROWNET 2.0 TRADING NETWORK  
           On 25 June, 2012, the TSE rolled out an upgrade of the trading network – Arrownet 
Version 2.0. Using a Broadband-Line service, and through the consolidation of multiple lines 
using the network virtualization technology, the network is believed to be more reliable in 
connecting the trading participants and users to the TSE trading and market information systems. 
With this upgrade, a major goal achieved is the reduction in the latency of stock trading on the 
exchange. Specifically, the upgrade reduced the round-trip order response time from two 
milliseconds to less than one millisecond on average, and it was further reduced to less than 0.1 
millisecond if the traders locate their servers in the co-location areas proximate to the exchange’s 
trading systems.
24
 In further analysis, we examine whether this technological advancement has 
any distinguishable effect on AT from the Arrowhead trading system adopted in January 2010.  
             To carry out the analysis, we re-define the Arrowhead dummy variable as follows: it 
takes a value of one if an observation is between 4 January, 2010 and 24 June, 2012 and zero 
otherwise.  We also introduce a separate dummy variable, Arrownet2, which is equal to one if 
the observation is on or after 25 June, 2012 and zero otherwise. We replicate the previous results 
by using both dummy variables as instruments in the first stage.  
                                                 
24
 http://www.tse.or.jp/english/system/networkservices/arrownet.html 
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We document strong evidence that the upgrade to the Arrownet 2.0 realizes the policy 
expectation and further facilitates AT. We show the effects of the Arrowhead and Arrownet 2.0 
on quoted spread in column (1) of Table 8 Panel A. The coefficient on Arrowhead is 0.088 (t-
statistic = 221.073) while the coefficient on Arrownet2 is 0.098 (t-statistic = 151.197), 11% 
larger than that of Arrowhead. The p-value of the Wald test confirms the statistical significance 
for the coefficient differences between these two dummy variables. The first-stage regression 
results are consistent across other liquidity measures and remain unchanged when we examine 
commonality in liquidity in Panel B. These results stress the importance of technological 
developments to AT. However, it is important to note that our second-stage estimation results are 
not affected even after controlling for Arrownet2 in the first stage.   
5. CONCLUSION  
In response to increasing attention devoted to AT, this study has attempted to clarify the impact 
of AT on stock liquidity in a limit-order driven market. In particular, we investigate how AT 
affects spread-based and market depth–based liquidity and commonality in liquidity during both 
normal and extreme market conditions.  
 Our research based on the instrumental variable (2SLS) approach yields several 
interesting empirical findings. First, after controlling for the endogenous relationship between 
AT and liquidity, using the introduction of the Arrowhead trading system in 2010 as the 
exogenous event, we show that the presence of AT significantly narrows quoted and effective 
spread and increases market depth. When decomposing effective spread, we show that the main 
source of the decrease in spread stems from the reduction in realized spread (revenues for 
liquidity providers). In addition, we find that AT increases monthly and intraday commonality in 
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liquidity, regardless of how we measure stock liquidity. Reduction of monitoring costs appears to 
explain the AT effects on liquidity and liquidity commonality. Finally, we find that the liquidity 
improving effect of AT weakens, but the positive effect of AT on liquidity commonality 
strengthens following bearish markets. 
 Our research carries significant implications for both researchers and policymakers, in 
relation to the surge of computer-driven trading activities in recent decades. In particular, we 
show that AT beneficially reduces spread-based transaction costs, but increases individual stock 
liquidity co-movement with market-wide liquidity at normal times. In addition, regulators should 
be aware of the effect of AT on liquidity and commonality in liquidity in extreme market 
conditions. In particular, the positive effects of AT on market quality are either weakened or 
reversed during market declines. Therefore, it is necessary to contemplate regulations and 
measures to oversee AT during times of financial stress.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Acronym Description 
AT Proxy   
Algorithmic trading proxy ATrade Dollar amount of trading volume (millions of Japanese yen) divided by the total number of 
quote updates in a continuous auction on a given trading day, multiplied by –1.   
Daily Liquidity Measures*   
Quoted spread QSpread Quote time duration weighted average of the difference between bid and ask prices divided 
by the midpoint of bid and ask prices on a given trading day multiplied by 10,000. This 
measure is adjusted for seasonality based on Equation (1). 
  
Effective spread ESpread Trading volume weighted average of the difference between trading price and the midpoint 
of bid and ask prices (trading price minus the midpoint for buyer-initiated trades, or 
midpoint minus trading price for seller-initiated trades), scaled by the midpoint on a given 
trading day, multiplied by 10,000. This measure is adjusted for seasonality based on 
Equation (1). 
  
  
Realized spread RSpread Trading volume weighted average of the difference between trading price and the midpoint 
of bid and ask prices five minutes later (trading price minus the midpoint five minutes later 
for buyer-initiated trades, or midpoint five minutes later minus trading price for seller-
initiated trades), scaled by the midpoint on a given trading day, multiplied by 10,000. This 
measure is adjusted for seasonality based on Equation (1). 
Adverse selection cost ASel Trading volume weighted average of the difference between the midpoint of bid and ask 
prices five minutes after a particular trade and the midpoint of prevailing bid and ask 
prices of the trade (the midpoint five minutes later minus prevailing midpoint price for 
buyer-initiated trades, or midpoint five minutes later minus prevailing midpoint for seller-
initiated trades), scaled by the midpoint on a given trading day, multiplied by 10,000. This 
measure is adjusted for seasonality based on Equation (1). 
Market depth at best quoted prices Depth Quote time duration weighted average of dollar amount of order flows at the best bid and 
ask prices on a given trading day (millions of Japanese yen). This measure is adjusted for 
seasonality based on Equation (1). 
Aggregated market depth at five levels of quoted 
prices 
Depth5 Quote time duration weighted average of dollar amount of order flows at five levels of  bid 
and ask prices on a given trading day (millions of Japanese yen). This measure is adjusted 
for seasonality based on Equation (1). 
*All liquidity measures are adjusted for weekly and monthly seasonality and the change of minimum tick size, by regressing the measures on the day of week, 
month, and price zone dummies. 
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Liquidity Commonality Measures   
Commonality in quoted spread CQSpread Logistically transformed R2 divided by (1 – R2), where R2 is estimated monthly for each 
stock from the regression of the daily change of adjusted quoted spread on the daily 
change of the cross-sectional average of the adjusted quoted spreads of all stocks in the 
market.  
Commonality in effective spread CESpread Logistically transformed R2 divided by (1 – R2), where R2 is estimated monthly for each 
stock from the regression of the daily change of adjusted effective spread on the daily 
change of the cross-sectional average of the adjusted effective spreads of all stocks in 
the market.  
Commonality in market depth at best quoted 
prices 
CDepth Logistically transformed R2 divided by (1 – R2), where R2 is estimated monthly for each 
stock from the regression of the daily change of adjusted market depth on the daily 
change of the cross-sectional average of the adjusted market depth of all stocks in the 
market.  
Commonality in aggregated market depth at five 
levels of quoted prices 
CDepth5 Logistically transformed R2 divided by (1 – R2), where R2 is estimated monthly for each 
stock from the regression of the daily change of adjusted aggregated market depth at 
five levels of quoted prices on the daily change of the cross-sectional average of the 
corresponding market depth measure of all stocks in the market.  
Control Variables  
 
   
Stock trading turnover Turn Daily number of shares traded in continuous auction, scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding, divided by 1,000. 
Stock return volatility Vol Difference between the highest and lowest stock price on a given trading day, divided by 
1,000. 
Inverse of stock price InvPrc The inverse of the daily closing stock price multiplied by 100. 
Market capitalization Size Log of the market capitalization in thousands of Japanese Yen. 
Market return MRet Daily market return, computed from the end-of-day value of TOPIX stock market index. 
Realized market volatility MVol The difference between the highest and lowest value of TOPIX market index. 
Expected market volatility VXJ Volatility Index Japan sourced from the Center for the Study of Finance and Insurance 
from Osaka University. 
Financial analyst coverage Analyst 
The number of financial analyst forecasts for the stock in the three months prior to 
financial year end month.  
Media coverage News 
The number of news messages for the stock made during the period from the previous 
day closing time to the closing on a given trading day. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports the mean, median, and standard deviation (SD) of the algorithmic trading variable 
(ATrade), six different stock liquidity measures by year and for the full sample in Panel A and those of 
control variables by year and for the full sample in Panel B. The six daily stock liquidity measures are 
quoted spread (QSpread), effective spread (ESpread), realized spread (RSpread), adverse selection cost 
(ASel), market depth at best bid and ask prices (Depth), and market depth at five levels of stock prices 
(Depth5). The spread measures are expressed in basis points. All liquidity measures are adjusted for 
monthly and weekly seasonality, as well as price zone variations. The control variables are daily measures 
of stock trading turnover (Turn), stock return volatility (Vol), the inverse of stock price multiplied by 100 
(InvPrc), the log of market capitalization (Size), daily stock market return (MRet) expressed in 
percentage, realized market volatility (MVol) and expected market volatility (VXJ). NStocks refers to the 
number of stocks in each year and the full sample. All the variables are defined in the Appendix. We 
winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 0.05% distribution of the pooled sample.  
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Table 1 – Continued 
Panel A: ATrade and liquidity variables 
Year NStocks 
 
ATrade QSpread ESpread Depth Depth5 RSpread ASel 
2007 1185 Mean -0.27 24.63 19.69 24.19 105.35 2.36 17.35 
  
 Med -0.11 18.73 14.28 4.13 20.53 0.43 13.11 
  
SD 0.49 22.19 18.38 245.32 660.47 15.46 16.20 
2008 1177 Mean -0.17 40.07 30.66 12.21 62.44 2.98 27.74 
  
 Med -0.07 28.26 21.61 2.47 12.37 -0.03 20.21 
  
SD 0.33 39.13 29.61 111.22 393.11 24.81 26.67 
2009 1159 Mean -0.13 37.66 30.81 13.46 66.78 4.59 26.27 
  
 Med -0.06 27.26 21.61 2.43 12.17 1.15 19.02 
  
SD 0.25 35.13 29.41 70.27 248.11 24.31 25.80 
2010 1139 Mean -0.07 31.88 27.61 23.43 107.76 5.77 21.83 
  
 Med -0.04 22.67 19.29 3.06 15.56 1.90 15.55 
  
SD 0.09 29.92 26.91 261.40 584.06 22.06 22.08 
2011 1132 Mean -0.06 31.61 27.87 18.04 94.65 5.18 22.66 
  
 Med -0.04 23.21 20.24 3.00 16.36 1.57 16.50 
  
SD 0.08 28.84 25.84 61.20 286.96 21.35 22.35 
2012 1144 Mean -0.06 31.22 27.83 18.51 98.87 5.32 22.37 
  
 Med -0.04 23.58 20.79 2.99 18.03 1.82 16.77 
  
SD 0.06 27.16 24.73 95.42 325.67 20.55 21.47 
All 1302 Mean -0.13 32.83 27.37 18.31 89.22 4.34 23.02 
  
Med -0.06 23.66 19.47 3.00 15.71 1.10 16.70 
  
SD 0.28 31.30 26.33 163.38 446.29 21.66 22.92 
          
Panel B: Stock- and market-level control variables 
Year NStocks  Turn Vol InvPrc Size MRet(%) MVol VXJ 
2007 1,185 Mean 4.55 0.18 0.24 17.80 -0.05 20.68 21.80 
  
 Med 2.12 0.01 0.16 17.55 0.02 18.44 19.73 
  
SD 15.44 1.86 0.33 1.40 1.22 9.97 5.77 
2008 1,177 Mean 4.12 0.21 0.37 17.41 -0.22 26.37 40.89 
  
 Med 1.80 0.01 0.23 17.18 -0.08 22.99 32.75 
  
SD 13.03 1.96 0.48 1.43 2.68 13.50 18.67 
2009 1,159 Mean 3.57 0.12 0.43 17.24 0.02 13.09 34.68 
  
 Med 1.30 0.01 0.28 17.05 0.03 11.91 30.33 
  
SD 15.10 1.11 0.52 1.41 1.54 5.64 10.82 
2010 1,139 Mean 3.42 0.10 0.42 17.26 0.00 9.13 24.49 
  
 Med 1.20 0.01 0.27 17.06 0.02 8.35 23.94 
  
SD 15.63 0.82 0.52 1.41 1.10 3.83 5.14 
2011 1,132 Mean 3.76 0.15 0.41 17.26 -0.09 9.24 26.37 
  
 Med 1.21 0.01 0.28 17.06 -0.01 7.65 24.43 
  
SD 15.56 1.37 0.46 1.38 1.44 8.25 8.30 
2012 1,144 Mean 3.72 0.11 0.41 17.24 0.07 7.65 20.15 
  
 Med 1.22 0.01 0.28 17.04 0.03 7.13 19.76 
  
SD 16.55 0.87 0.47 1.36 1.00 3.15 2.63 
All 1,302 Mean 3.86 0.15 0.38 17.37 -0.05 14.35 28.04 
  
Med 1.45 0.01 0.25 17.17 0.01 10.98 24.99 
  
SD 15.25 1.42 0.47 1.42 1.60 10.72 12.41 
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Table 2. Effects of AT on stock liquidity 
This table presents the results from the 2SLS regressions of individual stock liquidity measures on stock-level algorithmic trading and control 
variables. The baseline 2SLS regression models are:  
,, 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
7 8 ,
_
                    
     
  
       
 
i ti t i i t i t i t i t t
t t i t
Adj liq s ATrade Turn Vol InvPrc Size MRet
MVol VXJ
      (Second-stage regression model) 
, 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 7 8 ,
Pr
                  Re
i t i t i t i t i t i t
t t t i t
ATrade v Arrowhead Turn Vol Inv c Size
M t MVol VXJ
    
   
      
  
                     (First-stage regression model) 
Arrowhead is the instrumental variable in the first stage regression, which is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the observation is on or 
after 4 January, 2010 and zero otherwise. Adj_liq is measured by quoted spread (QSpread), effective spread (ESpread), realized spread (RSpread), 
adverse selection cost (ASel), market depth at best bid and ask prices (Depth), and market depth at five levels of stock prices (Depth5). All 
liquidity measures are adjusted for monthly and weekly seasonality, as well as price zone variations. ATrade refers to the algorithmic trading 
measure. The list of daily control variables includes stock trading turnover (Turn), stock return volatility (Vol), the inverse of stock price 
multiplied by 100 (InvPrc), log of market capitalization (Size), daily stock market return (MRet), realized market volatility (MVol) and expected 
market volatility (VXJ). Firm fixed effects are also included. Panel A reports the effects of AT on a variety of stock liquidity measures including 
QSpread, ESpread, Depth, and Depth5, while Panel B presents the effects of ATrade on each component of ESpread (i.e., realized spread 
(RSpread) and adverse selection cost (ASel)). All the variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of stock-day observations. The last row 
reports the p-values of the Hausman test. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2012.  
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Table 2 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Effects of ATrade on stock liquidity measures 
 
ATrade QSpread ATrade ESpread ATrade Depth ATrade Depth5 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
ATrade 
 
-14.298*** 
 
-3.089*** 
 
54.319*** 
 
238.896*** 
  
(-35.750) 
 
(-10.792) 
 
(17.650) 
 
(30.583) 
Arrowhead 0.090*** 
 
0.090*** 
 
0.090*** 
 
0.090*** 
 
 
(227.310) 
 
(227.308) 
 
(227.310) 
 
(227.310) 
 Turn -0.002*** -0.078*** -0.002*** -0.029*** -0.002*** 0.227*** -0.002*** 1.351*** 
 
(-238.149) (-57.307) (-238.149) (-29.870) (-238.149) (21.801) (-238.149) (51.110) 
Vol -0.013*** 0.156*** -0.013*** 0.451*** -0.013*** 7.238*** -0.013*** 31.161*** 
 
(-77.257) (9.828) (-77.257) (39.689) (-77.257) (59.273) (-77.257) (100.533) 
InvPrc -0.073*** 39.075*** -0.073*** 37.426*** -0.073*** 20.696*** -0.073*** 63.765*** 
 
(-87.480) (480.803) (-87.480) (643.562) (-87.480) (33.096) (-87.480) (40.173) 
Size -0.183*** -6.188*** -0.183*** -5.331*** -0.183*** 21.285*** -0.183*** 79.499*** 
 
(-276.512) (-56.811) (-276.512) (-68.387) (-276.512) (25.395) (-276.512) (37.368) 
MRet 0.012 -4.881*** 0.012 -7.782*** 0.012 -6.322 0.012 24.717 
 
(1.266) (-5.611) (1.267) (-12.502) (1.268) (-0.944) (1.268) (1.455) 
MVol -0.001*** 0.138*** -0.001*** 0.082*** -0.001*** -0.009 -0.001*** -0.056 
 
(-43.903) (74.281) (-43.901) (61.492) (-43.903) (-0.623) (-43.903) (-1.539) 
VXJ 0.001*** 0.283*** 0.001*** 0.130*** 0.001*** -0.267*** 0.001*** -1.289*** 
 
(59.261) (199.677) (59.262) (128.029) (59.262) (-24.449) (59.262) (-46.571) 
        
N 1,572,347 1,572,347 1,572,350 1,572,350 1,572,355 1,572,355 1,572,355 1,572,355 
p-value of Hausman Test   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
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Table 2 – Continued 
  Panel B: Effects of ATrade on ESpread components 
  ATrade RSpread ATrade ASel 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
ATrade   -2.293***  -1.501*** 
   (-5.403)  (-3.518) 
Arrowhead  0.090***  0.090***  
  (227.299)  (227.301)  
Turn  -0.002*** -0.070*** -0.002*** 0.038*** 
  (-238.137) (-48.497) (-238.140) (26.343) 
Vol  -0.013*** -0.178*** -0.013*** 0.630*** 
  (-77.255) (-10.574) (-77.253) (37.188) 
InvPrc  -0.073*** 22.805*** -0.073*** 12.533*** 
  (-87.481) (264.423) (-87.492) (144.406) 
Size  -0.183*** 1.313*** -0.183*** -7.522*** 
  (-276.518) (11.362) (-276.508) (-64.711) 
MRet  0.012 -4.153*** 0.012 -3.138*** 
  (1.272) (-4.499) (1.272) (-3.380) 
MVol  -0.001*** -0.078*** -0.001*** 0.159*** 
  (-43.938) (-39.362) (-43.935) (79.867) 
VXJ  0.001*** -0.041*** 0.001*** 0.175*** 
  (59.258) (-27.305) (59.254) (115.380) 
      
N  1,572,238 1,572,238 1,572,237 1,572,237 
p-value of 
Hausman test 
 
  0.002   0.000 
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Table 3. Effects of monitoring costs on the relation between AT and stock liquidity 
This table reports the second stage regression results from regressing liquidity measures on ATrade and 
its interaction with three alternative measures of monitoring costs controlling for stock characteristics. 
The second stage regression model of the 2SLS baseline regression models is as below:  
 
,, 1 2 , , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 9 10 ,
_ Pr
Re ,
i ti t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t t t t i t
Adj liq s ATrade ATrade MCost MCost Turn Vol Inv c
Size M t MVol VXJ
     
    
        
   
 
where monitoring cost (MCost) is represented by firm size (Size), analyst coverage (Analyst) and media 
coverage (News) in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. In the first stage regression, we regress ATrade and 
ATrade×MCost, respectively, on Arrowhead and Arrowhead×MCost together with other controls in the 
first stage model where Arrowhead is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the particular trading 
day is on or after January 4, 2010 and zero otherwise. The predicted values of ATrade and 
ATrade×MCost are used in the second stage model shown above. Adj_liq represents quoted spread 
(QSpread), effective spread (ESpread), market depth at best bid and ask prices (Depth), or market depth 
at five levels of stock prices (Depth5). All liquidity measures are adjusted for monthly and weekly 
seasonality, as well as price zone variations. ATrade refers to the algorithmic trading measure. The list of 
daily control variables includes stock trading turnover (Turn), stock return volatility (Vol), the inverse of 
stock price (InvPrc), log of market capitalization (Size), daily stock market return (MRet), realized market 
volatility (MVol) and expected market volatility (VXJ). Firm fixed effects are also included. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of stock-day 
observations. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2012.  
 
Panel A: Size as a proxy for monitoring costs 
 
QSpread ESpread Depth Depth5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
ATrade -419.121*** -125.062*** 417.786*** 1,376.000*** 
 
(-60.179) (-26.382) (8.417) (11.005) 
ATrade×Size 20.782*** 6.262*** -18.659*** -58.374*** 
 
(61.667) (27.297) (-7.769) (-9.648) 
Turn -0.164*** -0.055*** 0.305*** 1.593*** 
 
(-63.110) (-31.082) (16.456) (34.182) 
Vol 0.606*** 0.586*** 6.834*** 29.897*** 
 
(37.023) (52.626) (58.584) (101.737) 
InvPrc 41.775*** 38.240*** 18.272*** 56.182*** 
 
(504.860) (678.959) (30.984) (37.819) 
Size -2.876*** -4.333*** 18.312*** 70.196*** 
 
(-35.523) (-78.616) (31.734) (48.290) 
MRet -4.418*** -7.643*** -6.737 23.417 
 
(-4.747) (-12.064) (-1.016) (1.401) 
MVol 0.156*** 0.087*** -0.025* -0.107*** 
 
(82.951) (68.084) (-1.874) (-3.156) 
VXJ 0.278*** 0.128*** -0.262*** -1.276*** 
 
(183.103) (124.170) (-24.225) (-46.771) 
    
N 1,572,347 1,572,350 1,572,355 1,572,355 
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Table 3 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Analyst as a proxy for monitoring costs 
 
QSpread ESpread Depth Depth5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ATrade -25.731*** -5.497*** 104.209*** 377.202*** 
 
(-41.354) (-12.471) (22.151) (31.757) 
ATrade×Analyst 2.182*** 0.468*** -6.554*** -20.472*** 
 
(51.010) (15.456) (-20.267) (-25.076) 
Analyst 0.640*** 0.110*** -11.411*** -24.940*** 
 
(25.799) (6.238) (-60.803) (-52.634) 
Turn -0.095*** -0.032*** 0.309*** 1.573*** 
 
(-58.503) (-28.373) (25.323) (50.989) 
Vol 0.378*** 0.499*** 6.629*** 29.193*** 
 
(24.579) (45.771) (57.026) (99.467) 
InvPrc 39.395*** 37.503*** 22.538*** 66.353*** 
 
(486.776) (654.129) (36.832) (42.949) 
Size -6.464*** -5.367*** 29.731*** 97.283*** 
 
(-54.570) (-63.965) (33.198) (43.025) 
MRet -4.827*** -7.773*** -7.298 22.585 
 
(-5.486) (-12.470) (-1.097) (1.345) 
MVol 0.139*** 0.082*** -0.019 -0.079** 
 
(74.320) (61.851) (-1.329) (-2.210) 
VXJ 0.285*** 0.130*** -0.253*** -1.268*** 
 
(198.434) (128.172) (-23.308) (-46.274) 
     
N 1,572,347 1,572,350 1,572,355 1,572,355 
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Table 3 - Continued 
 
Panel C: News as a proxy for monitoring costs 
  QSpread ESpread Depth Depth5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
ATrade -15.451*** -3.331*** 57.102*** 249.045*** 
 
(-36.180) (-10.917) (17.419) (29.957) 
ATrade×News 0.450*** 0.111*** -0.717*** -2.163*** 
 
(35.608) (12.269) (-7.395) (-8.801) 
News 0.344*** 0.123*** 0.318*** 2.561*** 
 
(28.265) (14.083) (3.396) (10.800) 
Turn -0.078*** -0.029*** 0.221*** 1.323*** 
 
(-57.290) (-30.140) (21.220) (49.989) 
Vol 0.178*** 0.455*** 7.178*** 30.934*** 
 
(11.308) (40.449) (59.389) (100.920) 
InvPrc 39.093*** 37.431*** 20.682*** 63.750*** 
 
(481.065) (644.664) (33.157) (40.300) 
Size -6.222*** -5.334*** 21.449*** 80.196*** 
 
(-56.669) (-67.995) (25.451) (37.524) 
MRet -4.792*** -7.755*** -6.341 24.885 
 
(-5.500) (-12.458) (-0.948) (1.467) 
MVol 0.138*** 0.082*** -0.010 -0.061* 
 
(73.752) (61.210) (-0.677) (-1.680) 
VXJ 0.283*** 0.130*** -0.266*** -1.286*** 
 (198.951) (127.875) (-24.374) (-46.527) 
     
N 1,572,347 1,572,350 1,572,355 1,572,355 
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Table 4. Effects of algorithmic trading on commonality in stock liquidity 
Panel A of this table reports the results from the 2SLS regressions of monthly estimates of commonality in stock liquidity on the algorithmic 
trading variable and other control variables after controlling for the endogeneity of AT. The 2SLS baseline regression models are as below: 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 5 6 ,i t i i t i t i t t t t i tCLiq s ATrade Liq Size MRet MVol VXJ               (second-stage regression) 
, 1 2 , 3 , 4 5 6 ,i t i t i t i t t t t i tATrade v Arrowhead Liq Size MRet MVol VXJ               (first-stage regression) 
 
In the first stage regression, the algorithmic trading variable (ATrade) is regressed on the Arrowhead dummy variable and other control variables. 
The Arrowhead dummy variable is equal to one if the particular trading month is on or after January 2010, and zero otherwise.  In the second 
stage, we regress various monthly commonality in stock liquidity measures on the predicted value of ATrade estimated from the first stage, 
together with other controls. CLiq represents the monthly estimates of commonality in four stock liquidity measures: quoted spread (QSpread), 
effective spread (ESpread), market depth at best bid and ask prices (Depth), and market depth at five levels of stock prices (Depth5). All liquidity 
measures are adjusted for monthly and weekly seasonality, as well as price zone variations. Size is the monthly average of daily log of market 
capitalization. MRet is the monthly stock market return. MVol is the realized market volatility and VXJ is the expected market volatility. Firm 
fixed effects are also included. Panel B reports the 2SLS regression results of intraday commonality in liquidity measures on ATrade and other 
controls. The intraday commonality measures are logistically transformed R-squareds estimated daily from regressing the change in the 1-minute 
snapshot of each stock liquidity measure on the change in the corresponding market liquidity of the stock market portfolio (excluding the own 
stock). The first-stage estimation results are suppressed in Panels B and C. Firm fixed effects are also included. The t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of stock-month 
observations. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2012. 
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Table 4 – Continued 
 
Panel A: 2SLS estimation of effects of ATrade  on commonality in liquidity 
 
ATrade CQSpread ATrade CESpread ATrade CDepth ATrade CDepth5 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
ATrade 
 
3.862*** 
 
4.302*** 
 
2.997*** 
 
4.116*** 
  
(12.981) 
 
(13.866) 
 
(10.134) 
 
(14.030) 
Arrowhead 0.085*** 
 
0.085*** 
 
0.086*** 
 
0.087*** 
 
 
(44.506) 
 
(44.422) 
 
(45.135) 
 
(45.729) 
 Size -169.018*** 848.006*** -189.572*** 954.539*** -162.669*** 572.205*** -162.028*** 737.466*** 
 
(-62.816) (12.473) (-66.489) (12.336) (-67.078) (8.937) (-66.985) (11.598) 
MRet -0.748*** -17.253*** -0.834*** -39.615*** -0.688*** 0.066 -0.642** 7.335** 
 
(-2.801) (-4.786) (-3.131) (-10.551) (-2.585) (0.018) (-2.419) (2.027) 
MVol -1.829*** 49.909*** -1.752*** 51.606*** -1.876*** 16.807*** -1.861*** 28.637*** 
 
(-12.780) (22.346) (-12.278) (22.392) (-13.175) (7.475) (-13.101) (12.748) 
VXJ 1.242*** -2.724** 1.295*** -4.707*** 1.164*** 7.514*** 1.122*** 1.291 
 
(15.595) (-2.521) (16.389) (-4.202) (14.791) (7.025) (14.290) (1.207) 
QSpread -0.276*** -5.869*** 
      
 
(-5.005) (-7.942) 
      ESpread 
  
-1.265*** 2.028* 
    
   
(-17.521) (1.882) 
    Depth 
    
-0.108*** 0.767*** 
  
     
(-20.417) (9.944) 
  Depth5 
      
-0.059*** 0.346*** 
       
(-28.369) (10.733) 
        
N 74,092 74,092 74,076 74,076 74,096 74,096 74,096 74,096 
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Table 4 – Continued 
 
  Panel B: Effects of ATrade on intraday liquidity commonality 
 
 CQSpread CESpread CDepth CDepth5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
ATrade  1.469*** 0.865*** 2.899*** 8.845*** 
 
 (26.947) (16.299) (52.287) (138.040) 
Size  0.465*** -0.509*** 0.249*** 1.352*** 
 
 (34.583) (-30.200) (18.581) (87.298) 
MRet  0.807*** -0.361** 0.654*** -0.183 
 
 (7.008) (-2.540) (5.560) (-1.331) 
MVol  1.080*** -8.417*** -5.907*** 4.154*** 
 
 (4.348) (-28.070) (-23.302) (14.017) 
VXJ  0.551*** -7.670*** -1.437*** -12.068*** 
 
 (2.900) (-32.410) (-7.493) (-53.854) 
QSpread  1.190*** 
   
 
 (11.859) 
   ESpread  
 
9.036*** 
  
 
 
 
(38.354) 
  Depth  
  
0.692*** 
 
 
 
  
(45.375) 
 Depth5  
   
0.573*** 
 
 
   
(75.257) 
 
 
    N  1,559,235 1,216,585 1,572,311 1,570,965 
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Table 5. Effects of monitoring costs on the relation between AT and commonality in liquidity 
This table reports the second stage regression results of commonality in stock liquidity on algorithmic 
trading variable, ATrade, and its interaction with three alternative measures of monitoring costs. The 
second stage baseline regression model is:  
 
, 1 , 2 , , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 7 8 ,
_
              Re ,
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
t t t i t
CLiq s ATrade ATrade MCost MCost Adj liq Size
M t MVol VXJ
    
   
      
   
   
 
where monitoring cost (MCost) is represented by firm size (Size), analyst coverage (Analyst) and media 
coverage (News) in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. In the first stage regression, we regress ATrade and 
ATrade×MCost, respectively on Arrowhead and Arrowhead×MCost together with other controls in the 
first stage model where Arrowhead is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the particular trading 
month is on or after January 2010 and 0 otherwise. Then, the predicted values of ATrade and 
ATrade×MCost are used in the second stage. CLiq represents the monthly estimates of commonality in 
four stock liquidity measures: quoted spread (QSpread), effective spread (ESpread), market depth at best 
bid and ask prices (Depth), and market depth at five levels of stock prices (Depth5). All liquidity 
measures are adjusted for monthly and weekly seasonality, as well as price zone variations. Adj_liq is the 
monthly average of the four daily stock liquidity measures. Size is the monthly average of daily log of 
market capitalization. MRet is the monthly average of daily stock market return. MVol is the monthly 
average of daily realized market volatility. VXJ is the monthly average of the expected market volatility. 
Firm fixed effects are also included. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of stock-month 
observations. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2012. 
 
Panel A: Size as a proxy for monitoring costs 
 
CQSpread CESpread CDepth CDepth5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ATrade 62.347*** 68.552*** 51.477*** 66.955*** 
 
(13.510) (13.984) (10.600) (13.628) 
ATrade×Size -3,007.904*** -3,302.419*** -2,485.179*** -3,215.146*** 
 
(-13.514) (-13.960) (-10.609) (-13.576) 
Size 429.272*** 403.000*** 382.435*** 518.267*** 
 
(9.194) (7.966) (7.485) (9.980) 
MRet -15.557*** -37.633*** 2.822 11.499*** 
 
(-4.226) (-9.791) (0.751) (3.044) 
MVol 44.342*** 45.411*** 11.505*** 22.173*** 
 
(22.120) (22.016) (5.804) (11.124) 
VXJ 1.754* -0.274 9.626*** 3.421*** 
 
(1.648) (-0.249) (9.060) (3.210) 
QSpread -13.145*** 
   
 
(-15.367) 
   ESpread 
 
-10.734*** 
  
  
(-9.442) 
  Depth 
  
-0.286*** 
 
   
(-2.857) 
 Depth5 
   
-0.334*** 
    
(-7.495) 
  
N 74,092 74,076 74,096 74,096 
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Table 5 – Continued 
Panel B: Analyst as a proxy for monitoring costs 
 
CQSpread CESpread CDepth CDepth5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ATrade 5.950*** 6.669*** 4.626*** 6.297*** 
 (12.989) (13.914) (9.997) (13.490) 
ATrade×Analyst -0.387*** -0.437*** -0.290*** -0.377*** 
 (-12.649) (-13.648) (-9.365) (-12.082) 
Analyst -0.147*** -0.168*** -0.123*** -0.165*** 
 (-8.942) (-9.763) (-7.376) (-9.829) 
Size 925.270*** 1,024.178*** 671.701*** 882.241*** 
 (12.452) (12.320) (9.157) (11.930) 
MRet -16.753*** -39.021*** 0.749 8.497** 
 (-4.612) (-10.295) (0.205) (2.315) 
MVol 49.498*** 51.119*** 16.382*** 28.250*** 
 (22.301) (22.296) (7.354) (12.607) 
VXJ -2.456** -4.497*** 7.379*** 0.856 
 (-2.273) (-4.006) (6.850) (0.789) 
QSpread -7.350***    
 (-9.995)    
ESpread  -0.643   
  (-0.623)   
Depth   0.316***  
   (4.254)  
Depth5    0.044 
 
   (1.464) 
N 74,092 74,076 74,096 74,096 
Panel C: News as a proxy for monitoring costs 
 
CQSpread CESpread CDepth CDepth5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ATrade 4.669*** 5.218*** 3.616*** 4.964*** 
 
(13.042) (13.969) (10.039) (13.816) 
ATrade×News -0.395*** -0.425*** -0.284*** -0.387*** 
 
(-12.840) (-13.250) (-9.180) (-12.502) 
News 842.497*** 944.457*** 587.397*** 762.775*** 
 
(12.479) (12.380) (8.987) (11.699) 
Size -0.213*** -0.193*** -0.143*** -0.216*** 
 
(-11.345) (-9.821) (-7.523) (-11.391) 
MRet -18.005*** -40.230*** -0.259 6.947* 
 
(-5.040) (-10.820) (-0.072) (1.931) 
MVol 49.898*** 51.523*** 16.737*** 28.674*** 
 
(22.482) (22.518) (7.477) (12.823) 
VXJ -2.176** -4.176*** 7.705*** 1.391 
 (-2.040) (-3.780) (7.243) (1.309) 
QSpread -6.719*** 
   
 
(-9.216) 
   ESpread 
 
0.688 
  
  
(0.662) 
  Depth 
  
0.517*** 
 
   
(7.242) 
 Depth5 
   
0.173*** 
    
(6.129) 
N 74,092 74,076 74,096 74,096 
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Table 6. AT activities during extreme market conditions 
Panel A of this table reports the distribution of extremely positive and negative weekly market returns by 
year and for the full sample, where a weekly market return is an extremely positive (negative) market 
return if the previous weekly market return is the 1.5 standard deviation above (below) the unconditional 
mean of 52 weekly market return in the past 250 trading days. NDays denotes the number of trading days 
in the given sample period. Up (Down) reports the number of extreme positive (negative) weekly market 
returns; Mean (Up) (Mean (Down)) reports the mean value of the Up (Down) dummy variable. Panel B 
presents the panel regression of ATrade on extreme market conditions as well as other control variables. 
The baseline OLS regression model is:  
, 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 ,
, , , ,
Re Re
Re
Pr
i t t t t t t
t t t t i t
i t i t i t t i t
ATrade turn Up Down turn Up
turn Down Arrowhead Turn Vol
Inv c Size MVol VXJ 
    
 
    
    
    
 
where ATrade is the algorithmic trading variable multiplied by 1,000, and Return alternatively represents 
the absolute value of the previous week market index return (|MRet|) or its rank values (RAMRet). The list 
of daily control variables includes stock trading turnover (Turn), stock return volatility (Vol), the inverse 
of stock price (InvPrc), the log of market capitalization (Size), daily realized market volatility (MVol) and 
expected market volatility (VXJ). All variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N 
denotes the number of stock-day observations. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 
2012.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Extreme Market Conditions 
Year NDays Up Mean(Up) Down Mean(Down) 
2007 245 14 0.0479 28 -0.0548 
2008 245 22 0.0824 32 -0.0902 
2009 243 14 0.0796 1 -0.1039 
2010 245 8 0.0461 14 -0.0529 
2011 245 8 0.0579 14 -0.0810 
2012 248 19 0.0485 14 -0.0426 
2007-2012 1,471 85 0.0630 103 -0.0680 
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Table 6 – Continued 
 
 Panel B: AT in Extreme Market Conditions 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
|MRet| 0.026*** 0.102*** 
     (2.743) (7.629) 
   RAMRet   
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 
    
 
(7.848) (8.033) 
Up -0.001 0.003*** 
 
-0.002*** -0.014* 
  (-1.082) (2.958) 
 
(-3.006) (-1.821) 
Down -0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
-0.006*** 0.028*** 
  (-4.061) (3.349) 
 
(-5.596) (3.964) 
MRet×Up  -0.122*** 
      (-6.950) 
   MRet×Down  0.193*** 
      (10.404) 
   RAMRet×Up   
  
0.009 
    
  
(1.582) 
RAMRet×Down   
  
-0.025*** 
    
  
(-4.956) 
Arrowhead 0.090*** 0.091*** 
 
0.090*** 0.090*** 
  (15.351) (15.414) 
 
(15.362) (15.387) 
Turn -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
-0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (-7.337) (-7.337) 
 
(-7.337) (-7.337) 
Vol -0.013** -0.013** 
 
-0.013** -0.013** 
  (-2.027) (-2.028) 
 
(-2.028) (-2.028) 
InvPrc -0.073*** -0.072*** 
 
-0.073*** -0.073*** 
  (-6.196) (-6.194) 
 
(-6.195) (-6.195) 
Size -0.183*** -0.183*** 
 
-0.183*** -0.183*** 
  (-11.017) (-11.014) 
 
(-11.013) (-11.012) 
MVol -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.063) (-7.751)  (-8.055) (-7.931) 
VXJ 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (7.941) (7.966) 
 
(7.794) (7.924) 
    
   N 1,572,318 1,572,318 
 
1,572,318 1,572,318 
Adj. R
2
 0.550 0.550 
 
0.550 0.550 
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Table 7. Effects of AT on liquidity and commonality in liquidity following market declines 
This table reports the OLS regression results of stock liquidity (Panel A)/commonality in stock liquidity (Panel B) on the adoption of Arrowhead 
dummy variable, Arrowhead, and its interactions with market condition dummy variables (Up and Down). Arrowhead is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the particular trading month is on or after January 2010 and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, Up (Down) takes a value of one if the 
previous weekly market return is the 1.5 standard deviation above (below) the unconditional mean of 52 weekly market return in the past 250 
trading days, and zero otherwise. The four daily liquidity measures are quoted spread (QSpread), effective spread (ESpread), market depth at best 
bid and ask prices (Depth), or market depth at five levels of stock prices (Depth5). The unreported daily control variables used in Panel A are stock 
trading turnover (Turn), stock return volatility (Vol), the inverse of stock price (InvPrc), and the log of market capitalization (Size), daily stock 
market return (MRet), realized market volatility (MVol) and expected market volatility (VXJ). In Panel B, Up (Down) takes a value of one if the 
previous monthly market return is the 1.5 standard deviation above (below) the unconditional mean of 12 monthly market returns in the past year, 
and zero otherwise. The four commonality in liquidity measures are monthly estimates of commonality in four stock liquidity measures: quoted 
spread (CQSpread), effective spread (CESpread), market depth at best bid and ask prices (CDepth), and market depth at five levels of stock prices 
(CDepth5). Adj_liq is the monthly average of the respective daily stock liquidity measure. Size is the monthly average of daily log of market 
capitalization. MRet is the monthly average of daily stock market return. MVol is the monthly average of daily realized market volatility. VXJ is 
the monthly average of the expected market volatility.  Firm fixed effects are also included in all estimations. The t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of stock-month 
observations. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2012. 
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Table 7 – Continued 
 
 Panel A: Liquidity effects in extreme markets  Panel B: Commonality effects in extreme markets 
 
QSpread ESpread Depth Depth5  CQSpread CESpread CDepth CDepth5 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
                 
Arrowhead -1.650*** -0.579*** 5.281 22.850**  0.342*** 0.385*** 0.280*** 0.377*** 
 
(-7.732) (-4.520) (1.217) (2.049)  (13.834) (15.447) (10.928) (14.831) 
Arrowhead×Up -0.005 0.223** -0.868 0.384  0.228** 0.544*** 0.288*** 0.409*** 
 
(-0.042) (2.345) (-1.059) (0.152)  (2.376) (5.323) (2.791) (4.339) 
Arrowhead×Down 4.084*** 3.244*** -4.149*** -15.972***  0.476*** 0.657*** 0.196*** 0.215*** 
 
(18.163) (22.052) (-2.847) (-5.146)  (8.895) (12.325) (3.525) (3.993) 
Up -1.004*** -0.826*** 0.256 0.175  -0.293*** -0.440*** -0.255*** -0.177** 
 
(-8.847) (-11.065) (0.334) (0.074)  (-4.371) (-5.926) (-3.510) (-2.489) 
Down -0.303** -0.250*** 0.201 0.588  -0.292*** -0.474*** -0.192*** -0.189*** 
 
(-2.242) (-2.770) (0.240) (0.249)  (-8.822) (-13.295) (-5.310) (-5.633) 
         
N 1,572,310 1,572,313 1,572,318 1,572,318  72,821 72,805 72,825 72,825 
Adj.R
2
 0.709 0.783 0.356 0.459  0.052 0.042 0.028 0.054 
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Table 8. Differential effects of Arrowhead and Arrownet 2.0 on AT 
This table presents the 2SLS regression results of stock liquidity on AT activities in Panel A and of commonality in stock liquidity on AT 
activities in Panel B controlling for the differential effects of the implementation of Arrowhead and Arrownet 2.0 new trading systems in the first 
stage.  Arrowhead takes a value of one if the observation is between January 4, 2010 and June 24, 2012, and zero otherwise; Arrownet2 takes a 
value of one if the observation is on or after June 25, 2012, and zero otherwise. The four liquidity measures in Panel A are quoted spread 
(QSpread), effective spread (ESpread), market depth at best bid and ask prices (Depth), or market depth at five levels of stock prices (Depth5). 
The daily control variables used in Panel A are stock trading turnover (Turn), stock return volatility (Vol), the inverse of stock price (InvPrc), the 
log of market capitalization (Size), daily stock market return (MRet), realized market volatility (MVol) and expected market volatility (VXJ). In 
Panel B, the four commonality in liquidity measures are monthly estimates of commonality in four stock liquidity measures: quoted spread 
(CQSpread), effective spread (CESpread), market depth at best bid and ask prices (CDepth), and market depth at five levels of stock prices 
(CDepth5). Adj_liq is the monthly average of the respective daily stock liquidity measure. Size is the monthly average of daily log of market 
capitalization. MRet is the monthly average of daily stock market return. MVol is the monthly average of daily realized market volatility. VXJ is 
the monthly average of daily expected market volatility. Firm fixed effects are also included in all estimations. The last row presents the p-value of 
Wald test for the differences of the Arrowhead and Arrownet2 coefficients. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of stock-month observations. The sample period is from 
January 2007 to December 2012. 
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Table 8 – Continued 
 Panel A: Arrownet 2.0 and stock liquidity  
 
ATrade QSpread ATrade ESpread ATrade Depth ATrade Depth5 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ATrade 
 
-13.960*** 
 
-2.983*** 
 
53.688*** 
 
237.864*** 
  
(-35.010) 
 
(-10.449) 
 
(17.490) 
 
(30.528) 
Arrowhead 0.088*** 
 
0.088*** 
 
0.088*** 
 
0.088*** 
 
 
(221.073) 
 
(221.072) 
 
(221.074) 
 
(221.074) 
 Arrownet2 0.098*** 
 
0.098*** 
 
0.098*** 
 
0.098*** 
 
 
(151.197) 
 
(151.196) 
 
(151.194) 
 
(151.194) 
 Turn -0.002*** -0.077*** -0.002*** -0.029*** -0.002*** 0.226*** -0.002*** 1.349*** 
 
(-238.146) (-56.811) (-238.147) (-29.646) (-238.147) (21.684) (-238.147) (51.085) 
Vol -0.013*** 0.160*** -0.013*** 0.452*** -0.013*** 7.230*** -0.013*** 31.148*** 
 
(-77.219) (10.108) (-77.219) (39.820) (-77.219) (59.230) (-77.219) (100.528) 
InvPrc -0.073*** 39.100*** -0.073*** 37.434*** -0.073*** 20.648*** -0.073*** 63.687*** 
 
(-87.627) (481.598) (-87.626) (643.954) (-87.626) (33.035) (-87.626) (40.142) 
Size -0.182*** -6.110*** -0.182*** -5.306*** -0.182*** 21.139*** -0.182*** 79.260*** 
 
(-274.176) (-56.224) (-274.176) (-68.195) (-274.176) (25.268) (-274.176) (37.325) 
MRet 0.011 -4.824*** 0.011 -7.765*** 0.011 -6.427 0.011 24.544 
 
(1.146) (-5.550) (1.147) (-12.475) (1.148) (-0.960) (1.148) (1.445) 
MVol -0.001*** 0.139*** -0.001*** 0.082*** -0.001*** -0.010 -0.001*** -0.058 
 
(-44.639) (74.760) (-44.637) (61.697) (-44.638) (-0.718) (-44.638) (-1.601) 
VXJ 0.001*** 0.283*** 0.001*** 0.130*** 0.001*** -0.267*** 0.001*** -1.289*** 
 
(61.064) (199.804) (61.064) (128.035) (61.064) (-24.451) (61.064) (-46.576) 
        
N 1,572,347 1,572,347 1,572,350 1,572,350 1,572,355 1,572,355 1,572,355 1,572,355 
p-value of 
Wald Test 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
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Table 8 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Arrownet 2.0 and commonality in liquidity  
  ATrade CQSpread ATrade CESpread ATrade CDepth ATrade CDepth5 
 
Stage  1 Stage 2 Stage  1 Stage 2 Stage  1 Stage 2 Stage  1 Stage 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ATrade 
 
3.593*** 
 
4.041*** 
 
2.856*** 
 
4.017*** 
  
(12.213) 
 
(13.168) 
 
(9.727) 
 
(13.788) 
Arrowhead 0.084*** 
 
0.084*** 
 
0.085*** 
 
0.086*** 
 
 
(43.095) 
 
(43.016) 
 
(43.728) 
 
(44.306) 
 Arrownet2 0.095*** 
 
0.095*** 
 
0.096*** 
 
0.097*** 
 
 
(32.632) 
 
(32.563) 
 
(32.990) 
 
(33.420) 
 Size -167.784*** 795.193*** -188.298*** 897.910*** -161.402*** 545.694*** -160.751*** 718.818*** 
 
(-62.044) (11.812) (-65.729) (11.719) (-66.110) (8.573) (-66.011) (11.371) 
MRet -0.840*** -18.367*** -0.926*** -40.717*** -0.778*** -0.512 -0.733*** 6.928* 
 
(-3.139) (-5.129) (-3.466) (-10.916) (-2.917) (-0.142) (-2.755) (1.920) 
MVol -1.879*** 48.505*** -1.802*** 50.260*** -1.925*** 16.057*** -1.910*** 28.107*** 
 
(-13.089) (21.903) (-12.591) (21.992) (-13.481) (7.175) (-13.411) (12.569) 
VXJ 1.299*** -2.488** 1.352*** -4.466*** 1.220*** 7.624*** 1.179*** 1.364 
 
(16.113) (-2.317) (16.897) (-4.012) (15.310) (7.145) (14.823) (1.278) 
QSpread -0.279*** -5.969*** 
      
 
(-5.051) (-8.127) 
      ESpread 
  
-1.266*** 1.679 
    
   
(-17.532) (1.569) 
    Depth 
    
-0.108*** 0.752*** 
  
     
(-20.414) (9.783) 
  Depth5 
      
-0.059*** 0.340*** 
       
(-28.375) (10.597) 
  
N 74,092 74,092 74,076 74,076 74,096 74,096 74,096 74,096 
p-value of 
Wald test 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
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Figure 1. Time series of number of messages, trading volume, and algorithmic trading measures  
 
This figure depicts the time series of the daily cross-sectional average of the number of traffic messages, 
stock trading volume, and algorithmic trading measure, ATrade, from January 2007 to December 2012, 
where the number of traffic messages is the number of quote price updates at five levels of quoted prices, 
trading volume is the dollar amount of shares traded, and the algorithmic trading measure (ATrade) is the 
trading volume divided by the number of traffic messages multiplied by –1.  
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Graph (a) 
 
 
Graph (b) 
 
Figure 2. Time series of cross-sectional averages of ATrade and liquidity/commonality measures 
 
Graph (a) illustrates the time-series variations in the daily cross-sectional averages of ATrade, the quoted 
spread (QSpread), and the market depth (Depth), while Graph (b) presents the time-series variations in 
monthly cross-sectional averages of ATrade, the commonality in the quoted spread (CQSpread), and the 
commonality in market depth (CDepth) over the period from January 2007 to December 2012.  
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